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INTRODUCTION 
Armed conflict creates the need for humanitarian aid. International law 
creates the mechanisms by which parties provide humanitarian aid and cre­
ates obligations in connection thereto. The 1949 Geneva Conventions1 (the 
* J.D. 2004 
1. Four documents make up the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which govern the treatment of 
certain groups during armed conflict. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S 31 
[hereinafter First Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 
75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 6 U.S.T. 3316 [hereinafter Third Convention]; 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Convention]; collectively, the 1949 Geneva Con­
ventions (the "Geneva Conventions" or the "Conventions"). Although the details differ depending 
on the category of non-combatant, a number of articles are consistent from Convention to Conven­
tion and require the same level of care from parties to the conflict. These include the first three 
articles of each of the four Conventions [hereinafter Common Article 1, Common Article 2 and 
2019 
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"Conventions") form the humanitarian backdrop against which war is 
waged. The Conventions establish an impartiality standard in that they grant 
to humanitarian organizations the right of access to non-combatants during 
armed conflict.2 In the United States, the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act ("IEEPA")3 establishes a Presidential determination standard for 
humanitarian organizations acting in situations of armed conflict that allows 
the President to restrict and prohibit humanitarian organizations' activities 
without considering their impartiality. 4 Current circumstances present the 
need for immediate impartial humanitarian aid in armed conflicts to which 
the United States is a party.5 Contemporaneous use of IEEPA creates an 
imminent risk of a violation of the Conventions.6 
The Conventions create a guarantee of protection and care to non­
combatant military and civilian participants in an armed conflict7 and a right 
of access for impartial humanitarian organizations in order to facilitate that 
protection and care.8 Common Article 3 states than an obligation exists to 
provide care.9 This obligation to provide care has been acknowledged to 
Common Article 3) and the ninth article of the First, Second and Third Conventions, which appears 
as the tenth article of the Fourth Convention [hereinafter Common Article 9/ I OJ. 
2. This right is given only to humanitarian organizations that are impartial and do not dis-
criminate among those whom they aid. See Common Article 3, supra note I; see also infra Part I.A. 
3. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707 (2000). 
4. Id. § 1702. 
5. At the writing of this Note, the United States has a military presence in Afghanistan and 
in Iraq. See 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. II 2002) (authorizing the use of force in Afghanistan and Iraq). 
Both countries are receiving humanitarian aid from the United States government and various aid 
organizations and each country is a party to the Conventions. See Convention de Geneive pour 
/ 'ameileoration du son des blesseis et des maladies dans /es forces armeies en compagne, Champ 
d'application des quatre conventions, 26, 28 (June ], 2004) available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/ 
rs/i5/0.518.12.fr.pdf [hereinafter Champ d'application], listing signatories to the Conventions as of 
June I, 2004 as placed on deposit at the Departement Federal des Affaires Etrangeres, Switzerland. 
6. The U.S. ratified the Conventions with no relevant reservations. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441 
(2000) (including within war crimes any violation of Common Article 3). The United States also 
implemented the relevant portions of the Conventions. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 
152, 164-65 (D.D.C. 2004), rev'd, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd and remanded, 2006 WL 
1764793 (U.S. June 29, 2006); United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 797 n.8 (S.D. Fla. 1992) 
("Article 129 of Geneva ID is clearly non-self-executing, as it calls for implementing legislation; 
however, the remainder of the provisions do not expressly or impliedly require any action by Con­
gress, other than ratification by the Senate, to take effect."). 
7. See Common Article 3, supra note I; Common Article 9/10, supra note I .  
8. Id; see also FRANCOISE SOUCHET-SAULNIER, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HUMANITARIAN 
LAW 321 (Laura Brav ed. & trans., 2002) ("International humanitarian law clearly recognises the 
right of the International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC") and any other impartial humanitar­
ian body to undertake relief and protection operations, in conformity with the applicable 
conventions." ). 
9. See Common Article 3, supra note I ("The wounded and sick shall be collected and 
cared for"); COMMENTARY IV: GENEVA CONVENTIONS RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN 
PERSONS OF WAR IN TIME OF WAR 40 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter COMMENTARY IV] 
("[Common Article 3] expresses a categorical imperative . . . "). The Commentaries, drawn up and 
published by the ICRC in the years immediately following 1949, as a result of its role in the Con­
ventions' creation, negotiation and drafting, are the definitive interpretation of the Conventions. See 
Noriega, 808 F. Supp. at 795 n.6. 
August 2006] IEEPA 's Override Authority 2021 
allocate to humanitarian organizations the right to provide this care. 10 Any 
party to a conflict that is also a signatory1 1 to the Conventions (a "Party" 
under the Conventions' terminology)12 must ensure that it fulfills the guaran­
tee of protection and care and that these organizations have access to non­
combatants in need of aid.13 As a signatory, the United States bears this obli­
gation whatever the other party's or parties' status is with respect to the 
Conventions.14 
The Conventions specify that impartial humanitarian organizations have 
both a general right of access to aid non-combatants, 15 and specific duties to 
ensure and implement the provision of goods such as food, medical sup­
plies, and other articles necessary for the preservation of life. 16 The duty 
arises in part when the Parties delegate their obligations17 either by formal 
agreement or by default, and in part when an organization exercises its right 
10. See supra note 8; COMMENTARY I: GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF 
THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 58 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 
1952) [hereinafter COMMENTARY I] (noting that, unlike the limited access available to the ICRC in 
earlier wars, Common Article 3 "has placed matters on a different footing, an impartial humanitar­
ian organization now being legally entitled to offer its services."). 
11. The Conventions do not define the term "Party," but the commentaries to each of the 
Conventions describe the term as including parties to a conflict, and other neutral, allied or enemy 
nations involved. COMMENTARY III: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRIS­
ONERS OF WAR 26 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) [hereinafter COMMENTARY III]. 
12. At the time of writing, 190 countries, including Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and North Korea, 
were signatories ("High Contracting Parties") to the Conventions. Champ d'application, supra note 5. 
13. See supra notes IO and 11. 
14. Common Article 2 reads in relevant part: 
[T]he present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed con­
flict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of 
war is not recognized by one of them. 
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Pow­
ers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall 
furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and 
applies the provisions thereof. 
Common Article 2, supra note I. Furthermore: 
[The Geneva Conventions] are coming to be regarded less and less as contracts concluded on a 
basis of reciprocity in the national interests of the parties and more and more as a solemn af­
firmation of principles respected for their own sake, a series of unconditional engagements on 
the part of each of the Contracting Parties vis-a-vis the others. 
COMMENTARY III, supra note 11, at 20. Where a party is a non-signatory and has not accepted and 
applied the provisions of the Conventions pursuant to Common Article 2, supra note I, customary 
international law will deem that the Conventions apply. See The Secretary General, Repon of the 
Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), 'lI 35, U.N. 
Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) (''The part of conventional international humanitarian law which has 
beyond doubt become part of international customary law is the law applicable in armed conflict as 
embodied in: the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 . . . .  "). 
15. See Common Article 3, supra note I; Common Article 9/10, supra note I. 
16. See, e.g., Third Convention, supra note I, art. 73; Fourth Convention, supra note I, arts. 
23, 55, 59, 61. 
17. See supra note 15. 
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to access which, once exercised, results in an obligation to comply with the 
Conventions' demands.18 Humanitarian organizations subject to the United 
States' jurisdiction19 routinely export items in connection with their opera­
tions from the United States.20 These organizations also use donated funds to 
purchase goods within the zone of conflict.21 
The President can use IEEPA to broadly limit these activities, restricting 
humanitarian organizations and inhibiting the United States' performance of 
its obligations under the Conventions.22 Congress passed IEEPA in 1977 to 
grant to the President broad authority to prohibit or otherwise restrict mone­
tary and other property transactions involving a foreign person during times 
of national emergency and in similar situations. 23 Humanitarian donations of 
goods are exempt from this authority.24 Congress delegated to the President 
18. When a Party to a conflict is unable to fulfill its obligations under the Fourth Convention, 
these duties are delegated to a Protecting Power, often an impartial humanitarian organization. See 
Fourth Convention, supra note I, art. 11; COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, GENEVA CONVENTIONS 
FOR THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 84-9, at 6 (1955). These delegable obli­
gations include the provision of aid. See Fourth Convention, supra note I, art. 61. Other 
international treaties create similar obligations for humanitarian organizations. See, e.g., Int'! 
Comm. of the Red Cross, Report on the Activity of the International Committee of the Red Cross for 
the Indemnification of Former Allied Prisoners of War in Japanese Hands, Article I6 of the Peace 
Treaty of 8 September 1951 Between the Allied Powers and Japan 5 (1971) (equating the ICRC's 
role thereunder to its role under the Conventions, and describing the ICRC's "responsibilities" and 
"mandate"). 
19. IEEPA applies to "donations, by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." 
50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(2). For an individual's charitable donations to be deductible for purposes of 
federal and state taxes, the recipient organization must comply with Internal Revenue Code section 
170(c)(2)(A), which requires incorporation in a U.S. state and thus creates U.S. jurisdiction over 
both the donor and the recipient organization. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS 796 (7th ed. 1998). Donations made by U.S. persons to an organization outside of 
United States jurisdiction where a subsequent transfer of the articles could also fall within IEEPA, 
depending on how many degrees of separation the President deems applicable. See Peter L. Fitzger­
ald, Hidden Dangers in the £-Commerce Data Mine: Governmental Customer and Trading Panner 
Screening Requirements, 35 INT'L LAW 47, 52 (2001) (discussing the reach of IEEPA and similar 
prohibitions by stating that "those who engage in impermissible dealings with blacklisted compa­
nies may, in tum, find themselves blacklisted"). 
20. For example, Medecins Sans Frontieres I Doctors Without Borders ("MSF') regularly 
ships food and medical supplies to countries within which it works, including Iraq and Afghanistan. 
See Independent Aid in Iraq Virtually Impossible, MEDECINS SANS FRONTIEREs!DOCTORS WITHOUT 
BORDERS, Apr. 23, 2004, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/2004/04-23-2004.efm; Press 
Release, Medecins Sans Frontiers/Doctors Without Borders, Alarming Food Crisis in Northern 
Afghanistan (Feb. 21, 2002), http://www.msf.org. 
21. Potable water is one of the articles most likely to be sourced within a zone of 
conflict. See Oxfam, What We Do: Water and Sanitation, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/ 
emergencies/how_we_work/water_sanitation.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2005); CARE, CARE Inter­
national in Sudan, http://www.careintemational.org.uk/cares_work/where/sudan/ (last visited Oct. 
22, 2005). 
22. See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(2). 
23. See H.R. Res. 7738, 95th Cong. § 202 (1977) (enacted) (authority granted to deal with 
"unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or in substantial part outside the 
United States, to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States"); see also id. 
§ 203(a) (authorizing the President to prescribe regulations on transactions pursuant to § 202). 
24. The statute reads, in relevant part: 
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the ability to override the exemption under certain circumstances, such as 
where the President determines the donations are in conflict with national 
security, involve coercion, or would endanger U.S. military.25 The exemp­
tion is intended to balance individual donors' interests with those of the 
government during a time of emergency.26 The override authority grants 
such wide discretion to the President to place prohibitions or restrictions 
on humanitarian aid that the safety net created by the Conventions can be 
erased.27 IEEPA does not require that the President satisfy any specific 
independent criteria in order to override28 as long as he has declared a na­
tional emergency.29 When the national emergency coincides with an armed 
conflict involving the United States, the President's use of the override 
The authority granted to the President by this section does not include the authority to regulate 
or prohibit, directly or indirectly ... 
( 2) donations, by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of articles, such as 
food, clothing, and medicine, intended to be used to relieve human suffering, except to the ex­
tent that the President determines that such donations (A) would seriously impair his ability to 
deal with any national emergency declared under section 1701 of this title, (B) are in response 
to coercion against the proposed recipient or donor, or (C) would endanger Armed Forces of 
the United States which are engaged in hostilities or are in a situation where imminent in­
volvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances; ... 
50 u.s.c. § 1702(b). 
25. Id. 
26. See S. REP. No. 95-466, at 5 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4540, 4544 
("The exercise of emergency controls would be restricted in order to enable U.S. persons to make 
humanitarian contributions in accordance with their consciences ... "). 
27. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(2). Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, courts have 
referred more frequently to the override section of IEEPA. For instance, Global Relief Foundation, 
Inc. v. O 'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779 (N.D. Ill. 2002) states that: 
Congress did not include any sort of temporal or geographic limitation on the President's abil­
ity to block humanitarian aid. There is no statement that the President can only block the 
distribution of international aid or that he can only block aid to specific foreign persons in 
specified foreign locations. Instead, Congress enacted broad, sweeping language which author­
ized the President to block any and all humanitarian efforts by the targeted entity so long as he 
declares that the provision of such relief would jeopardize his ability to deal with a national 
emergency. 
Id. at 795. It is relevant that the Global Relief court was commenting in a case regarding an Islamic 
charity in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks. The court's wide reading of the President's 
IEEPA powers in this case is likely to be used as precedent in other situations even only tangentially 
related to September 11. 
28. See S. REP. No. 95-466, at 5 (noting the President's authority to prohibit any donations 
of humanitarian articles which could "subvert, contravene, or preclude effective exercise of emer­
gency authority"). It is only the President who must determine that the conditions are satisfied. 50 
U.S.C. § l 702(b)(2)(A)-( C). 
29. The relevant statute states: 
Any authority granted to the President by § 1702 of this title may be exercised to deal with any 
unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the 
United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the 
President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat. 
50 U.S.C. § 170l(a)( l). 
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authority is both politically detrimental and a potential violation of the 
United States' international obligations.30 
The United States' current military actions threaten the guarantees of the 
Conventions. The invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, the war in Iraq 
beginning in early 2003, and the ongoing and imprecise war against terror­
ism each requires adherence to the humanitarian rules of the Conventions.31 
The George W. Bush administration has stated that it considers both Iraq 
and Afghanistan to be supporting terrorist activities,32 creating a likelihood 
of broad use of the override authority in each conflict. Neither country has 
sufficient resources to maintain its population.33 The Conventions' minimum 
requirements for humane treatment require provision of certain goods such 
as medical supplies that often are not available in the location of a conflict. 34 
An impartial humanitarian organization carrying out its obligation to ensure 
the rights of a non-combatant needs to furnish goods from outside the zone 
of conflict. When the organization brings these needed articles from the 
United States the supplies come under the purview of IEEPA and therefore 
are subject to the override authority.35 
For example, consider a United States charity that provided food, medi­
cal care and tents for displaced persons in Iraq during the period of active 
military activity between the United States and Iraq. The Conventions apply 
to this situation of armed conflict. 36 The organization, therefore, has a right 
30. A violation of the Conventions by the United States might be used by other countries as 
justification for ignoring the Conventions when the United States' interest in upholding humanitar­
ian law is greater; for example, if armed conflict were to exist on U.S. territory. See, e.g., LOUIS 
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 210-11 (1996) ("Particularly as regards 
multilateral treaties of general applicability . . .  inconsistent legislation by Congress not only vio­
lates international obligations but ruptures international consensus which the President-and-Senate 
helped achieve."). 
31. The Conventions apply to all international armed conflicts. Common Article 2, supra 
note 1 ("[T]he present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed 
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties .. . "). 
32. See President George W. Bush, Address to the Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 20, 2001) 
(transcript available at 2001 WL 1104160) ("Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda"); President 
George W. Bush, Weekly Radio Address (Mar. 22, 2003) (transcript available at 2003 WL1441066) 
(condemning the Taliban regime in Afghanistan for its support of Al Qaeda, noting Al Qaeda's con­
trol over the Taliban, and stating that "our mission is clear ... to end Saddam Hussein's support for 
terrorism"). 
33. See Open Borders to Iraqis, CNN.com, Mar. 19, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/ 
WORLD/meast/03/19/sprj.iraq.aid/index.html ("Sixty percent of Iraqis depend entirely on food 
rations imported under the U.N.'s oil-for-food programs, and household supplies could run out 
within weeks if distributions stop."); Press Release, Medecins Sans Frontieres/Doctors Without 
Borders, Alarming food crisis in nonhem Afghanistan, supra note 20. 
34. See supra note 20. The Conventions include an obligation to provide food and medical 
supplies, see Fourth Convention, supra note I, art. 55. 
35. See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(2) (2000); see also Veterans Peace Convoy, Inc. v. Schultz, 722 
F. Supp. 1425, 1432 (S.D. Tex. 1988) (holding that § I 702(b)(2) covers articles "which the donor 
intends to be used to relieve human suffering if the articles can reasonably be expected to serve that 
purpose"). 
36. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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of access to all non-combatant Iraqis and certain obligations to provide aid37 
as long as its actions are impartial. The frequent acts of terrorism38 com­
bined with the significant humanitarian needs in Iraq raise the distinct 
possibility that members of terrorist organizations need aid. It is unlikely 
that the organization could both satisfy the requirement of impartiality-i.e., 
provide food and care without discrimination to those in need-and at the 
same time avoid aiding those whom the United States might deem terrorists. 
This situation can trigger,39 and has triggered,40 application of the override 
authority. 
Executive Order 13,224,41 issued on September 23, 200 1, is a recent use 
of the override authority in connection with an armed conflict to which the 
United States is a party, and provides an example of IEEPA's breadth. The 
President attached to this Order a list of entities affirmatively subject to the 
prohibitions and restrictions authorized by Section 1702(b )(2).42 The list 
includes any persons who provide support to or associate with the persons 
listed or otherwise designated in the Order.43 The Order permits the Secre­
tary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
Attorney General, to add to the list at his discretion.44 The Order also in­
cludes a specific reference to humanitarian donations and prohibits 
donations to any person designated by, or later included within, the Order.45 
The Order applies in all situations of armed conflict, including Afghanistan 
and Iraq at the writing of this Note, and restricts humanitarian aid with such 
37. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. 
38. In October 2004, the United Nations Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee added 
the al-Zarqawi network to the list of terrorist organizations subject to Security Council Resolution 
1267. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Committee Adds One Entity to Al Qaeda 
Section of Consolidated List, U.N. Dec. S/8219 (October 18, 2004). 
39. 50 U.S.C. § l 702(b)(2) (the override authority applies to "donations ... of articles such 
as food, clothing and medicine "). 
40. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R. § 786 (2001), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1701 (West 2005). The order was issued pursuant to IEEPA following Presidential findings that an 
increased risk of terrorism existed in the United States which merited heightened regulation of fi­
nancial and other transactions, including donations of the articles listed in § l 702(b )(2). Id. 
Executive Order 13,224 was amended in 2005 to broaden the scope of the override to include dona­
tions "by," "or for the benefit of' persons included on the list, where Executive Order 13,224 had 
originally included only donations "to" such persons. Exec. Order 13,372, 70 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Feb. 
18, 2005). During 2003 and using similar language, President Bush invoked the override authority in 
connection with Iraq, Exec. Order No. B,315, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,315 ( Sept. 3, 2003), reprinted in 50 
U.S.C.A. § 1701 (West 2005), Burma, Exec. Order No. 13,310, 68 Fed. Reg. 44,853 (July 30, 2003), 
reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (West 2005), and the former Yugoslavia, Exec. Order No. 13,304, 
68 Fed. Reg. 32,315 (May 29, 2003), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (West 2005). President Clin­
ton invoked the override authority in 1995 in connection with negotiations regarding the peace 
process in the Middle East. Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5,079 (Jan. 25, 1995), reprinted in 
50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (2000). 
41. Exec. Order No. 13,224. 
42. Exec. Order No. 13,224, at annex. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
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breadth that the United States could be in breach of its obligations under the 
Conventions.46 
This Note argues that, should the President exercise his override author­
ity to prohibit or restrict the donation of humanitarian articles during an 
armed conflict involving the United States, the resulting prohibition or re­
striction would cause the United States to violate its obligations under the 
Conventions. This Note does not assert that the United States should not 
have the ability to put in place controls to prevent terrorists from benefiting 
from donations of funds and other humanitarian items;47 instead, it asserts 
that domestic law must tread as lightly and narrowly as possible where a 
widely accepted multilateral treaty exists and that domestic law ought not to 
override humanitarian law48 under the later-in-time rule unless absolutely 
necessary. IEEPA's breadth permits, and the war on terror and related con­
flicts are likely to encourage, restrictions and prohibitions that disrupt the 
balance that the Conventions demand. Part I contends that when the Presi­
dent exercises the full power granted to him in the override authority, such 
action violates international law because the restrictions permitted by 
IEEPA conflict with humanitarian organizations' right of access under the 
Conventions. Part II discusses the implications of a violation of the Conven­
tions on both the international and domestic planes. Part II demonstrates that 
an analysis under the Charming Bets/9 doctrine does not necessarily dis­
pose of the question, and that Congress's established ability to override 
treaties under the later-in-time doctrine is inapplicable in this case, where 
IEEPA's lack of specificity creates legal difficulties and political dilemmas 
for the United States. 
I. IEEPA AUTHORIZE S A BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
Given the range of authority granted to the President under IEEPA, a 
Presidential nullification of the humanitarian donation exemption can via-
46. The Order was issued to help combat terrorist activities, and therefore applies to all 
aspects of the "war on terror, " and individually to the United States' presence in Iraq and Afghani­
stan. Exec. Order No. 13,224 (listing in the preamble the "the continuing and immediate threat of 
further attacks on United States nationals or the United States " as the basis for the order). 
47. See The Role of Charities and NGO's in the Financing of Terrorist Activities: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Int'/ Trade and Fin. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 
107th Cong. 3 (2002) [hereinafter Role of Charities and NGO 's] (statement of Sen. Evan Bayh) 
("[L]egitimate charities have been exploited when their field operations have been infiltrated by 
terrorist elements, particularly in areas of conflict. ... Today's hearing will examine how terrorist 
groups exploit charities and NGOs and ways to curtail the flow of money to these organizations 
while preserving humanitarian aid."). 
48. Humanitarian law is generally considered to be the set of rules that govern armed con­
flicts. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Normative Framework of International Humanitarian 
law: Overlaps, Gaps and A mbiguities, in 1 International Criminal Law 617, 617 (M. Cherif Bas­
siouni ed., 2d ed., 1999) (defining humanitarian law as "that body of norms that protects certain 
categories of persons and property and prohibits attacks against them ... be they of an international 
or non-international character."). 
49. Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) ("an act of Congress ought never 
to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other construction remains ... "). 
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late the Conventions by improperly limiting the activities of impartial hu­
manitarian organizations during armed conflict. Section I.A argues that 
despite the absence of a definition of "impartial" in the text, it is possible 
and necessary to distinguish between organizations that have rights and ob­
ligations under the Conventions and those that can be validly restricted. It 
then discusses the role of impartial humanitarian organizations within the 
Conventions, and concludes that such organizations have a right to access, a 
right to deliver aid, and, when they have exercised those rights, obligations 
toward each non-combatant during armed conflicts. Section l.B provides 
examples that illustrate the potential for conflict between the right of access 
granted to impartial humanitarian organizations by the Conventions and the 
implementation of the override authority. It concludes that IEEPA's Presi­
dential determination standard improperly limits the activities of these 
organizations. 
A. Impartiality and the Rights of Impartial Humanitarian 
Organizations under the Conventions 
The Conventions' text sets forth the minimum aid requirements with 
which Parties must comply.50 Parties must provide certain levels of care and 
protection without discrimination to non-combatants in situations of armed 
conflict.51 Per the Conventions' text and the Commentaries as their definitive 
interpretation,52 impartial humanitarian organizations play a significant role 
50. COMMENTARY IV, supra note 9, at 37 ("[T]he applicable provisions [of Common Article 
3] represent a compulsory minimum."). The Conventions are a complement to the Hague Conven­
tions of 1899 and 1907, which codify the laws and customs of war. See Convention with Respect to 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403 [hereinafter Laws 
and Customs of War of 1899]; Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539. The predecessor 1864 Geneva Convention stated that 
wounded or sick combatants, to whatever nation they belong, shall be collected and cared for. Con­
vention intemationale au sujet des militaires blesses sur Jes champs de bataille, art. 6, Aug. 22, 1864, 
22 Stat. 940, T.S. No. 377. The same philosophy underlies the 1949 Conventions, promulgated in 
reaction to the conduct of Nazi Germany and Japan and the conditions in which many of the thirty 
eight million combatant and non-combatant casualties of World War II lost their lives. See David A. 
Elder, The Historical Background of Common A rticle 3 of the Geneva Convention of 1949, 11 CASE 
W. RES. J. INT'L. L. 37 (1979). 
51. See, e.g., Third Convention, supra note I, art. 16 ("[A]ll prisoners of war shall be treated 
alike ... without any adverse distinction based on race, nationality, religious belief or political opin­
ions, or any other distinction founded on similar criteria"); Fourth Convention, supra note l, art. 13 
("The provisions ... cover the whole of the populations of the countries in conflict, without any 
adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, nationality, religion or political opinion."). Non­
discrimination can be taken as a proxy for impartiality, given the text of the non-discrimination 
clauses and the interpretation of impartiality as discussed herein. The Conventions do not define 
impartiality explicitly, but do provide direction for the international community to define humanitar­
ian organizations to which the Conventions apply. Although the International Court of Justice 
("ICJ") has not yet addressed the definition of impartiality, other courts have cited the United Na­
tions ("UN") as an example. See Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 6780174 and 6950175, 2 Eur. Comm'n 
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 125 ("a neutral and impartial organization such as the UN"). The Commentaries 
to the Conventions address impartiality more specifically, stating that humanitarian organizations 
"must not be affected by any political or military consideration," and yet "it should be noted that 
impartiality does not necessarily mean mathematical equality." COMMENTARY I, supra note 10. 
5 2. See supra note 11. 
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in the implementation of and adherence to these requirements.53 There is an 
omnipresent danger that Parties will tend toward their inherent biases, and 
therefore the Conventions give impartial participants a role. Once involved, 
these impartial participants have an obligation to act in order to ensure com­
pliance with the Conventions.54 It is important to ascertain a clear definition 
of "impartial" because terrorists have the ability to obtain funding through 
organizations that, while superficially charitable, do not act in an im8artial 
manner and should not benefit from the Conventions' rights of access. 
Both the Conventions and IEEPA protect against the risk of terrorist 
funding, but IEEPA goes beyond what is necessary and limits legitimate and 
necessary aid. Only when an organization meets the impartiality standard do 
the Convention rights and consequent obligations attach.56 Humanitarian 
organizations are conscious of the need to adhere to the impartiality stan­
dard in order to ensure their ability to insist on a right of access.57 Thus, 
53. The general right of access to aid the four categories of non-combatants and the obliga­
tions attached thereto extend not just to ICRC but also to other "impartial humanitarian bod[ies]." 
See Common Article 3, supra note I; Common Article 9/10, supra note I. The official commentar­
ies of the Conventions repeatedly refer to other impartial organizations, compelling the conclusion 
that the ICRC is not the only entity that can fill this role. See COMMENTARY ill, supra note 11, at 35 
("[T]he wording finally adopted .. . provides a legal basis for interventions by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial humanitarian organization" (emphasis added)). 
One example of an impartial humanitarian organization is OXFAM, which is "dedicated to fighting 
poverty and related injustice around the world." Oxfam International, Who We Are, 
http://www.oxfam.org/eng/about_ who.htm (last viewed Oct. 22, 2005). Other examples are CARE 
and MSF, the latter of which was established with the objective of "providing medical aid wherever 
needed, regardless of race, religion, politics or sex." MSF, http://www.msf.org (last viewed Oct. 22, 
2005). 
54. See COMMENTARY I, supra note 10; see also Mary Ellen O'Connell, Humanitarian Assis­
tance in Non-International Armed Conflict: The Founh Wave of Rights, Duties and Remedies, 31 
lsR. YEARBOOK ON HUM. RTS., 183, 183 (2002) ("[A]id, when offered by the State, seldom comes 
without strings ... . Usually governments' concerns are the same as those of the NGOs. There are 
many cases, though, when the State's agenda is at odds with basic humanitarian beliefs."). 
55. See supra note 47. 
56. All of these rights are enforceable against the High Contracting Parties. See Common 
Article I, supra note I; see also COMMENTARY I, supra note 10, at 26 ("[I]n the event of a Power 
failing to fulfill its obligations, the other Contracting Parties (neutral, allied or enemy) may, and 
should endeavor to bring it back to an attitude of respect for the Convention."). Although the obliga­
tion to comply with a treaty is implicit for the nations that have ratified it, see Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 ("Pacta sunt servanda: Every treaty 
in force is binding upon the Parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith"), the reitera­
tion of this principle in the opening article of the Conventions underscores the weight of the 
obligations. See BoucHET-SAULNIER, supra note 8, at 344. The question of standing is beyond the 
scope of this Note. While some might argue that the humanitarian organizations' right is worthless 
without a remedy, such an argument fails because the Conventions allow a remedy, see Fourth Con­
vention, supra note I, art. 146 (obligating the Parties to enact legislation and to otherwise suppress 
violations of the Conventions), and U.S. courts have intimated that they would recognize such a 
remedy. See United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. at 799 ( "[I]t is inconsistent with both the lan­
guage and the spirit of the [Third Convention] and with our professed support of its purpose to find 
that the rights established therein cannot be enforced by the individual . .. "). 
57. See Humanitarian Crisis in Afghanistan: Is Enough Aid Reaching Afghanistan?: Hear­
ing Before the S. Foreign Relations Comm., Subcomm. on East Asian and South Asian Affairs, 107th 
Cong. 23 (2001) (statement of Nicolas de Torrente, Exec. Director, MSF ) (stating that impartiality 
"means that humanitarian actors should not take sides and should be free from political influence, so 
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organizations that are "charitable" in name only, established to channel 
money to terrorists, do not have these rights.58 The Conventions, therefore, 
incorporate protections against the same risks that Congress tried to address 
in drafting IEEPA.59 Unlike prohibitions created by use of the override au­
thority,60 however, the Conventions do not inhibit activities of impartial 
organizations providing valid aid in satisfaction of the protective obligations 
that arise during an armed conflict. 
By virtue of the role of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
("ICRC") in connection with the Conventions and the Commentaries and in 
the development of humanitarian law, it is reasonable to incorporate its in­
terpretation of the articles and its definition of impartiality into the 
Conventions.61 The ICRC's constitutional documents parallel the language 
of the Commentaries. In describing the way in which humanitarian organi­
zations determine priorities of care in delivering aid during armed conflict, 
the ICRC defines impartiality as making "no discrimination as to national­
ity, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions."62 
Other humanitarian organizations that model themselves on the ICRC 
and the ICRC's interpretation of impartiality are allocated the rights and 
obligations by the Conventions. The Conventions set out these rights and 
obligations through general principles and more detailed articles based on 
that they can go after their objective single-mindedly to impartially help people solely based on the 
criteria of need."). 
58. See COMMENTARY IV, supra note 9, at 98 ("A belligerent Power can obviously not be 
obliged to tolerate in its territory activities of any kind by any organization." (emphasis added)). 
Certain organizations identified in recent U.S. cases appear to fall outside the Conventions. See, e.g., 
Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the 
evidence showing that foreign terrorists held an interest in the organization's assets in the United 
States was sufficient for the organization to fall within Executive Order 13,224 ). 
59. See S. REP. No. 95-466, at 5 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4540, 4544 (stating 
a goal of avoiding donations that "subvert, contravene, or preclude effective exercise of emergency 
authority."). 
60. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R. § 786 (2001), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1701 (West 2005). 
61. See Elder, supra note 50, at 38 ('"The International Committee of the Red Cross, in light 
of the widespread revulsion emanating from the contemporaneous major international and national 
war crimes trials, endeavored to solicit support for rectification of some of the deficiencies of hu­
manitarian legal protection evidenced by the Second World War."). The ICRC drew up and 
published the Commentaries to the Conventions. See supra note 12; see also O'Connell, supra note 
54, at 183. 
62. Proclamation of the Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross (1965), reprinted in IN­
TERNATIONAL RED CROSS HANDBOOK 17 (12th ed. 1983). The impartiality standard does not require 
an organization to fulfill every need of everyone but does subject choices about whom to aid to an 
objective assessment. The editor of the Commentaries states that impartial aid "excludes subjective 
differentiation." Jean Pictet, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Peace, 239 INT'L 
REV. RED CROSS 79 (1984) (emphasis added). None of the Conventions, the Commentaries, or the 
ICRC Statute suggests that impartial organizations must deliver aid uniformly but rather that they 
must allocate resources according to need. For example, rather than utilizing a first-come, first­
served basis, medicine in short supply might be allocated first to children and pregnant women, who 
have weaker immune systems. See BouCHET-SAULNIER, supra note 8, at 141 ("Impartiality must 
not be confused with a mathematical neutrality that would consist of providing equal aid to each 
party present, under the pretext of not favoring anyone. Impartiality actually requires that relief be 
given in priority to those who need it, regardless of their affiliation."). 
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these principles. The general principles are common to all four Conventions. 
The Conventions63 delineate the broad obligation to aid non-combatants and 
the mechanism by which this aid should be provided. These articles do not 
set forth the maximum set of rights that a Party could, at its discretion, allo­
cate to organizations, but rather the baseline on which other articles build 
and provide specificity. 
One reading of the phrase "may offer"64 in Common Article 3 denotes 
optionality on both sides: the organization is not obliged to put forth its ser­
vices, nor is the Party in control of the relevant territory compelled to accept 
such an offer.65 The ICRC agreed to this language on the principle that states 
would uphold their moral obligation to involve the organizations in order to 
facilitate aid.66 Numerous scholars have commented on the extreme improb­
ability that the parties would exercise the apparent optionality in the text of 
Common Article 3. These authors assert that it is reasonable to conclude that 
the organizations have a right to be present and to fulfill the obligations con-
63. Common Article 3, supra note 1; Common Article 9/10, supra note I. Common Article 3 
binds Parties to treat non-combatants humanely, without discrimination, and to care for the wounded 
and sick, and states that "[a]n impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of 
the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict." Common Article 3, supra note I. 
Although Common Article 3 by its text applies to "armed conflict not of an international character," 
the article was characterized from the outset as the "Convention in miniature," COMMENTARY I, 
supra note 10, at 48 (citing an unnamed delegate), and so establishes a minimum level of protections 
due to non-combatants in all armed conflicts, including civil wars. The Commentary states: 
Article 3 refers only to cases of conflict not of an international character. But, if these provi­
sions represent (as they do) the minimum applicable in a non-international conflict, that 
minimum must a fortiori be applicable in an international conflict. That is the guiding principle 
common to all the Geneva Conventions. That is their justification. 
Id. at 23. The ICJ has concluded that "[t]here is no doubt that, in the event of international armed 
conflicts, these rules also constitute a minimum yardstick, in addition to the more elaborate rules 
which also apply to international conflicts." Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
19861.C.J. 14, 'JI 218 (June 27); see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995) (assert­
ing subject matter jurisdiction in part on the basis that violations of Common Article 3 are violations 
of the law of nations). Common Article 9/10 (as included in the Fourth Convention covering civil­
ians) reads in full as follows: "The provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle to the 
humanitarian activities which the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other impartial 
humanitarian organization may, subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict concerned, un­
dertake for the protection of civilian persons and for their relief." Common Article 9110, supra note 
I. As with Common Article 3, Common Article 9110 was incorporated to facilitate protection of 
non-combatants. COMMENTARY IV, supra note 9, at 98-99 (stating that the Article was included in 
order to "leave the door open for any initiative or activity, however unforeseeable today, which may 
be of real assistance in protection of civilians"); see also Major Maxwell et al., Non-Governmental 
Organizations and the Military, 1999-NOV ARMY LAW. 17, 21. 
64. See Common Article 3, supra note I ("[a]n impartial humanitarian body, such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict."). 
65. See Elder, supra note 50, at 49. 
66. See COMMENTARY I, supra note 10, at 58 (noting that, unlike the limited access available 
to the ICRC in earlier wars, Common Article 3 "has placed matters on a different footing, an impar­
tial humanitarian organization now being legally entitled to offer its services"). The ICRC rejected 
other language, which would have "superficially" strengthened the role of humanitarian organiza­
tions, in order to preserve independence of action. Elder, supra note 50. 
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sequent to that presence.67 The right of access granted by Common Articles 
3 and 9110 is subject to few practical constraints,68 and humanitarian organi­
zations are justified in acting in the capacities delineated in the Conventions, 
and in receiving from the Parties the autonomy to do so, as long as they 
meet the impartiality standard.69 
B. Conflict of IEEPA Restrictions with Convention Rights 
Convention articles that cover specific types of impartial aid establish 
obligations owed to non-combatants that, while conditional under certain 
circumstances, cannot be abrogated by the blanket restrictions on or prohibi­
tions of donations of goods that IEEPA perrnits.70 Together with the general 
obligations imposed by Common Articles 3 and 9/10, these articles create a 
system of aid which the Parties must adhere to and provide for in conjunc­
tion with the ICRC or other impartial humanitarian organizations.71 By 
enabling action such as Executive Order 13 ,224,72 IEEPA creates an envi­
ronment in which the President can eviscerate these protections for 
non-combatants, placing the United States in violation of international law.73 
Although not every invocation of the override authority necessarily vio­
lates the United States'  obligations under the Conventions,74 IEEPA's 
67. See COMMENTARY I, supra note 10, at 58 (stating that a Party incapable of fulfilling its 
obligations under the Conventions which "refuses offers of charitable service from outside its fron­
tiers will incur a heavy moral responsibility"); Elder, supra note 50, at 67; Denise Plattner, 
Assistance to the Civilian Population: the Development and Present State of International Humani­
tarian Law, 288 lNT'L REv. RED CROSS 249, 261 (1992) ("Although the relevant text entitles it only 
to offer its services, the principle that the I C R C  may operate in a country ravaged by internal armed 
conflict is now generally accepted "). But see Peter Macalister- Smith, Rights and duties of the agen­
cies involved in providing humanitarian assistance and their personnel in armed conflict, in 
ASSISTING THE VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICT AND OTHER DISASTERS 108 (Frits Kalshoven ed., 
1988) (emphasizing that for states wishing to limit humanitarian organizations' access, certain parts 
of the Conventions "make this type of reaction possible "). 
68. Common Article 9/1 O's text, similar to Common Article 3 's, might be read to allow states 
to refuse aid by humanitarian organizations but the similarity of the two articles compels the same 
argument as stated above for Common Article 3. See supra text accompanying notes 66 and 67. 
69. See, e.g. , COMMENTARY IV, supra note 9, at 110-11 ("But being bound to apply the 
Convention, [Parties] alone must bear the responsibility if they refuse to help in carrying out their 
engagements"); Michael Bothe, Relief Actions: The Position of the Recipient State, in ASSISTING 
THE VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICT AND OTHER DISASTERS 92 (Frits Kalshoven ed., 1988) (stating 
that the Conventions create "an obligation [on the part of the Parties] to accept relief."). Bothe notes 
further that the negotiating record and later statements by the signing governments support both this 
interpretation and the assumption "that the requirement of a consent implies an obligation to give 
this consent " except in limited situations of valid necessity. Id. at 94. 
70. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(2) (listing "articles such as food, clothing and medicine" within the 
override authority). 
71. See Common Articles 3 and 9/10; see also supra text accompanying notes 57 and 58. 
72. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R. § 786 (2001), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1701 (West 2005). 
73. 50 U.S.C. § l 702(b )(2) (2000); see supra text accompanying notes 36 through 40. 
74. See Exec. Order No. 13,224; Exec. Order No. 13,284, 68 Fed. Reg. 4075 (Jan. 23, 2003) 
(specifying a number of organizations that are not, in fact, impartial humanitarian organizations 
under the definition applicable to the Conventions; however, the Executive Order directs that 
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language allows Executive Orders to contain sweeping prohibitions and cre­
ates no system of checks and balances to avoid such a violation. 75 
Prohibiting donations of goods necessary for providing aid to non­
combatants under either the general right to care of Common Articles 3 and 
9/10, or specific rights allocated in other articles, would incapacitate hu­
manitarian organizations in their efforts to provide aid. 76 Such incapacitation 
would result in a breach of the responsibilities the United States undertook 
upon ratification and implementation of the Conventions. Comparing the 
language of a number of these articles with the broad-based approach per­
mitted under IEEPA demonstrates these potential conflicts. 
Article 23 of the Fourth Convention requires free passage for various ba­
sic items. 77 Parties may require evidence that the items will not be diverted, 
that control will not be ineffective, and that no "definite" military or eco­
nomic advantage will accrue to the other party by the latter's use of the 
goods as a replacement for its own supplies.78 Article 23's conditions appear 
on their face to match a stated rationale for the IEEPA override authority: to 
avoid donations that "subvert, contravene, or preclude effective exercise of 
emergency authority."79 
There are differences that may lead to violations of international law. 
IEEPA contains no requirement to identify the specific potential harm; a 
prohibition imposed relying on the statute could therefore violate the free 
passage obligations under Article 23. Article 23 goes on to say that supervi­
sion by an impartial humanitarian organization can cure the risks of 
diversion and advantage.80 The President's authority to prohibit under 
IEEPA should be more narrowly conditional in order to not conflict with the 
legal obligation to ensure free passage of goods. The override authority 
additional organizations and persons may fall within its jurisdiction without conditioning such in­
clusion on partiality). 
75. 50 U.S.C. § 1 703 (2000) (requiring the President to report to Congress at any instance of 
exercise of Presidential authority under § l 702(b )(2), but requiring consultation with Congress only 
"in every possible instance"). 
76. See, e.g. , http://www.oxfamamerica.org/publications/art3659.html (last visited Sept. 24, 
2005) (describing conditions in Afghanistan in [December 200 1 ] :  "Thousands of Afghans fled their 
homes for refugee camps, both inside Afghanistan and in neighboring countries. Oxfam brought 
emergency water systems to several of these camps, sharing with refugees the importance of sanita­
tion in such close quarters. Without this intervention, thousands might have died from malaria, 
diarrhea, and other preventable diseases."). Mass movement of civilians only creates additional 
problems. See Macalister-Smith, supra note 67, at 1 09 (noting that lack of consent from Parties will 
force humanitarian organizations to provide aid in camps in adjacent countries, resulting in migra­
tion of those in need of aid). 
77. Fourth Convention, supra note 1, art. 23. 
78. Id. An example of diversion and ineffective control is supply lines controlled by terrorist 
organizations, either with or without the support of the local government. An example of advantage 
is provision of wheat to a party without either its own source of wheat or a substitute; the donated 
wheat would free funds for other uses because of the reduced need to use the funds for food. 
79. See S. REP. No. 95-466, at 5 ( 1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4540, 4544. 
80. See Fourth Convention, supra note 1, art. 23. The Protecting Power obligations are often 
delegated to the ICRC or another impartial humanitarian organization. See Fourth Convention, supra 
note 1 ,  art. 1 1 .  
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should be limited to situations where the President both (i) ascertained that 
the delivery of articles would result in a "definite" advantage to a hostile 
Party81 and (ii) required specific information showing "a serious reason for 
fearing"82 that the articles would be diverted to terrorists83 in order to fit 
within the Conventions.84 
Individually and collectively, Articles 55, 59, 63 and 142 of the Fourth 
Convention permit only narrow regulation and restriction of humanitarian 
organizations' role in delivering articles to protected civilians in occupied 
territory85 and not a blanket prohibition as is possible under IEEPA.8 An 
Occupying Power87 has a duty under Article 55 to ensure provision of [suffi­
cient] food and medical supplies for the population, subject only to the 
phrase "to the fullest extent of the means available to it."88 When, as in Iraq, 
the United States is an Occupying Power,89 an invocation of the override 
authority improperly limits the means available to fulfill the nation's obliga­
tions under Article 55.90 
Article 63 provides limited ability to restrict impartial humanitarian or­
ganizations, stating that an Occupying Power may restrict the activities only 
by way of "temporary and exceptional measures . . .  for urgent reasons of 
8 1 .  Fourth Convention, supra note 1 ,  art. 23. 
82. Fourth Convention, supra note 1, art. 23. 
83. In some cases, the hostile party will be a country considered to be harboring or otherwise 
supporting terrorists. See, e.g., supra note 32. 
84. Instead, the override authority requires only a national emergency, see SO U.S.C. 
l 70l (a)( l ), and satisfaction of Presidential discretion conditions. See SO U.S.C. l 702(b)(2). 
85. Fourth Convention, supra note 1, sec. ID and IV. 
86. so u.s.c. § l 702(b )(2). 
87. A territory is occupied when it is "actually placed under the authority of the hostile 
army." See Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, supra note SO, art. 
42. Occupation continues until a local government establishes "full and free exercise of sover­
eignty," ICRC, Occupation and international humllnitarian law: questions and answers, 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/634KFC (last visited April 8, 2004), but a situation 
may revert to occupation if the hostile army retakes control in the absence of local government 
consent. Id. 
88. Article SS obliges an Occupying Power to "bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical 
stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate." COMMENTARY IV, 
supra note 9, at 309. Article S9 requires "free passage of these consignments" subject only to the 
opposing power's ability to search and regulate the consignments to ensure that the articles are 
destined for "the needy population" and not the Occupying Power itself. Id. at 320 ("The obligation 
on the Occupying Power to accept such relief is unconditional."). 
89. See S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003) ("recognizing the specific authorities, 
responsibilities, and obligations of [the United States] as [an] occupying power [in Iraq]"); see also 
Asli 0. Bali, Justice under Occupation: Rule of Law and the Ethics of Nation-Building in Iraq, 30 
YALE J. INT'L L. 43 1 ,  470-7 1 n. 1 24 (noting that the United States' ongoing military presence and 
activities make it the "de facto ruler of Iraq"); Jordan J. Paust, The U.S. as Occupying Power Over 
Portions of Iraq and Relevant Responsibilities Under the Laws of War, ASIL INSIGHTS, 1 (April 
2003). 
90. The conditions in Iraq require articles to be imported because, prior to the invasion, food 
and medical goods were available mainly under the UN's oil-for-food program, see Waiting, with 
Bravado and Anxiety, EcoNOMIST, Oct. 17,  2002, at 4 1 ,  which was halted when the invasion began. 
Press Release, United Nations, United Nations Oil-For-Food Programme to end on 21 November; 
Coalition Provisional Authority to Take Responsibility, U.N. Doc. IK 404 (Nov. 19,  2003). 
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security."91 Article 142 allows Parties to limit activities of relief societies92 
"essential to their security"93 only if the restriction does not "hinder the sup­
ply of effective and adequate relief to all protected persons."94 These specific 
and narrow restrictions are not equivalent to the intent or the apparent effect 
of IEEPA, which allows restrictions and prohibitions for additional reasons 
and for unlimited periods of time.95 
IEEPA's text, unlike the articles of the Conventions, does not provide a 
sufficiently specific description of the situations in which the President can 
bar donations.96 Although the United States relies heavily on humanitarian 
organizations during both war and peacetime, when the United States is a 
party to a conflict, the President is increasingly likely to find that conditions 
exist that justify exercise of the override authority.97 While it is undisputed 
that the President should have the power to prevent funds from being sent or 
diverted to terrorists, IEEPA casts its net too broadly.98 
9 1 .  Fourth Convention, supra note I, art. 63. 
92. Relief societies, like impartial humanitarian organizations, are not defined in the Conven­
tions; regardless of whether the two are deemed to be equivalent, Article 142 refers to "relief 
societies, or any other organizations assisting the protected persons." Fourth Convention, supra note 
I, art. 142. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. 50 U.S.C. § 1 702(b)(2) does not place any temporal boundaries on the President's invo­
cation of the override authority, except to the extent Congress may terminate the national emergency 
under 50 U.S.C. § 1 622 and subject to specification in such termination that the Presidential authori­
ties in 50 U.S.C. § 1 702 are to be discontinued. See 50 U.S.C. § 1706(b); see also Exec. Order No. 
1 3,224, 3 C.F.R. § 786 (2001), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C.A. § 1 70 1 (West 2005) (including 
an effective date and no termination date). 
96. See 50 U.S.C. § 1 702(b)(2)(A) ("would seriously impair his ability to deal with any 
national emergency" (emphasis added)); 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(2)(C) ("in a situation where imminent 
involvement is clearly indicated" (emphasis added)). 
97. 50 U.S.C. § 1 702(b)(2)(A)-(C) (the override authority can be invoked when the President 
determines donations would impair his ability to deal with a national emergency, are in response to 
coercion, or would endanger Armed Forces of the United States). Terrorism and United States in­
volvement in armed conflict are increasingly intertwined, resulting in declarations of national 
emergency under 50 U.S.C. § 1701  that in tum create a greater likelihood of exercise of the override 
authority. President G.W. Bush has invoked the override authority numerous times during his presi­
dency. See supra note 40; see also Islamic American Relief Agency v. Unidentified FBI Agents et 
al., 394 F. Supp. 2d 34, 40, 46-47 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (mem.) (stating that the President can use the 
override authority to prohibit donations where the evidence shows that an organization has provided 
support of acts of terrorism); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Indictments Allege Illegal Finan­
cial Transfers to Iraq: Visa Fraud Involving Assistance to Groups that Advocate Violence (Feb. 26, 
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/February/03_crm_l 1 9.htm (quoting John 
Ashcroft, Att'y Gen. of the United States) ("As President Bush leads an international coalition to 
end Saddam Hussein's tyranny and support for terror, the Justice Department will see that individu­
als within our borders cannot undermine these efforts. Those who covertly seek to channel money 
into Iraq under the guise of charitable work will be caught and prosecuted."). 
98. Three other legal mechanisms create a viable bulwark against terrorist financing: the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1 999, S. 
TREATY Doc. No. 106-49 (2000), 39 l.L.M. 270, Resolution 1 373 of the United Nations Security 
Council, S.C. Res. 1 373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 373 (Sept. 28, 2001 ), and the Antiterrorism and Effec­
tive Death Penalty Act of 1 996, Pub. L. No. 104-1 32, 1 10 Stat. 1 21 4  ( 1 996), codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339A (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000) and 8 U.S.C. § 1 1 89 (2000). Each of these makes it an 
offense to transfer property with either the intent or the knowledge that the property is directed 
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Executive Order 13 ,224, for example, allows the prohibition of humani­
tarian relief by and to many persons who are unconnected to terrorist 
activities.99 A significant percentage of impartial humanitarian organizations 
operating in, or likely to operate in, theaters of war are subject to United 
States jurisdiction. I()() Limiting or prohibiting access of impartial humanitar­
ian organizations subject to U.S. jurisdiction by use of the override authority 
would leave only those organizations without U.S. connections free to pro­
vide aid. 101 In large conflicts and in locations where local and smaller 
humanitarian organizations are unequipped or otherwise insufficient, this 
would result in insufficient aid and a consequent breach of the United 
States' Convention obligations.102 IEEPA appears to allow the President to 
operate in a realm outside of both the United States' stated commitment to 
adhere to the obligations imposed by the Conventions103 and the flexibility 
toward actual or intended terrorist activity. None of these has the breadth to encompass impartial 
humanitarian organizations: 
AEDPA does not grant the Secretary unfettered discretion in designating the groups to which 
giving material support is prohibited. The statute authorizes the Secretary to designate only 
those groups that engage in terrorist activities. This standard is not so vague or indeterminate 
as to give the Secretary unfettered discretion. For example, the Secretary could not, under this 
standard, designate the International Red Cross or the International Olympic Committee as ter­
rorist orgartizations. Rather, the Secretary must have reasonable grounds to believe that an 
organization has engaged in terrorist acts-assassinations, bombings, hostage-taking and the 
like-before she can place it on the list. (emphasis added). 
Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1 1 30, 1 1 37 (9th Cir. 2000). 
99. See Himamauli Das, United States Sanctions Response to the Attacks of September 11 ,  
2001: A Synopsis of Remarks at  the NESL Rogue Regimes Conference, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 943 
(2002): 
[Executive Order 1 3,224] may further be used to target other entities or individuals that are 
acting for or on behalf of, or are owned or controlled by, persons designated in or pursuant to 
the Order; that assist in or provide support or financial or other services to those entities and 
individuals designated in or under the Order; or are associated with certain categories of enti­
ties and individuals designated in or under the Order, as determined by the Secretary of the 
Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General. This may in­
clude non-governmental or charitable organizations, as well as financial institutions in third 
countries that provide financial or other services to or for persons designated in or pursuant to 
the Order. 
1 00. For example, CARE, OXFAM and Medecins Sans Frontieres are all incorporated in the 
United States and each is subject to U.S. jurisdiction. See supra note 2 1 .  
1 0 1 .  5 0  U.S.C. § l 702(b)(2) (the override authority applies to "persons subject to the jurisdic­
tion of the United States"). 
102. Most large humanitarian organizations fall under U.S. jurisdiction, supra note 1 00, and 
without their involvement, aid to Iraq would be severely lacking. See David Finkel, Aid Efforts for 
Iraqis Stalled at Border: Bush Promises Assistance Soon, WASH. PosT, March 23, 2003, at A l 5  
(noting that many humanitarian organizations were waiting i n  Kuwait during the United States' 
attacks because the situation in Iraq was too dangerous). The United States, as an Occupying Power, 
supra note 89, would therefore not be satisfying the requirements of the Conventions. See supra 
note 14.  
103.  Letter of Submittal from the Department of State, incorporated in the Message from the 
President of the United States Transmitting The Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
August 1 2, 1 949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Noninternational Armed Conflicts, 
Concluded at Geneva on June 10, 1 977, 26 l.L.M. 561 ,  567 ( 1 987) [hereinafter Department of State 
Protocol II Letter) (stating that "for its part, the United States would expect that the requirement of 
consent by the party concerned would not be implemented in an arbitrary manner, and that essential 
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demanded by the international community's interpretation of the Conven­
tions' text. Limiting impartial humanitarian organizations in such a manner 
is not permitted under international law. 
II. IMPLICATIONS OF IEEPA's OVERRIDE AUTHORITY 
An exercise of the IEEPA override authority could result in serious do­
mestic and international legal repercussions because of the Conventions' 
unique status as non-derogable, multilateral law created to protect individu­
als. Section II.A argues that an analysis under Charming Betsy does not 
conclude that IEEPA can coexist with the Conventions, and that additional 
analysis applying the later-in-time rule is necessary. Section 11.B argues that 
once the Executive demonstrates a conflict between the Conventions and 
IEEPA, the nature of the Conventions demands particular adherence, and 
therefore, that the customary view that the later-in-time rule allows domestic 
derogation of international law does not apply. Section 11.C argues that the 
international legal obligations established by · the Conventions exist regard­
less of the treaty's status under domestic law. Section 11.C also argues that 
because the United States' duties under the Conventions cannot be fulfilled 
solely on the international plane, domestic prohibitions under IEEPA result 
in a violation of the Conventions. Section 11.D provides a summary of policy 
issues that arise when a party to an armed conflict limits the role of impar­
tial humanitarian organizations and argues that these policy considerations 
also compel observance of the Conventions. 
A. Application of the Charming Betsy Canon 
For over 200 years, as dictated by the Charming Betsy canon,104 U.S. 
courts have construed acts of Congress as consistent with international law 
unless such a construction is impossible. 105 The Supreme Court has ruled 
that even if Congress provides no direction in the text of a statute with re­
spect to the dictates of a treaty, the presumption is that the two should be 
read to coexist. 106 The purpose of the canon is to respect principles of com-
relief shipments would only be restricted or denied for the most compelling and legitimate reasons." 
The letter also discusses Protocol II, which the State Department described in the same document as 
"designed to expand and refine the basic humanitarian provisions contained in [Common) Article 3 
. . .  " Id. at 563. The rights allocated to impartial humanitarian organizations under Article 1 8  of 
Protocol II do not deviate from Common Article 3 and Common Article 9/10. Protocol Additional 
(II) to the Geneva Conventions of 1 2  Aug., 1 949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non­
Intemational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (June 8, 1977), 26 l.L.M. 561 , 1 125 U.N.T.S. 609. De­
partment of State Protocol II Letter, supra, at 567. 
104. Murray v. The Channing Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 1 18 ( 1 804) ("[A]n act of Congress ought 
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains . . .  "). 
105. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 8 1 5  ( 1 993) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 ( 1 982); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 ( 1 953); The Charm­
ing Betsy, 6 U.S. at 1 1 8. 
106. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 29 1 ( 1 98 1 )  ("[C]ongressional silence is not to be 
equated with congressional disapproval."). 
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ity107 and to allow a balancing of interests. 108 Where Congress specifically 
identifies a need to position United States' interests above those of a treaty 
partner or the international community as a whole, a clear statement elimi­
nates the need to read consistency into the two laws. '09 
Although IEEPA's text does not indicate an explicit intent to overrule the 
Conventions and the override authority is facially ambiguous with regard to 
the role of impartial humanitarian organizations, Charming Betsy analysis 
could conclude that the two laws can coexist."0 Despite IEEPA's apparent 
breadth, applying Charming Betsy in this situation of facial ambiguity limits 
IEEPA's restrictions and prohibitions to the narrower restrictions permitted 
by the Conventions." '  Applying Charming Betsy, IEEPA must be read to 
prohibit and restrict transactions, including donations of humanitarian 
goods, only to the extent such limitations have no impact on the ongoing 
obligations the United States undertook upon ratification and implementa­
tion of the Conventions.1 12 Humanitarian organizations therefore must have 
the level of access and the ability to provide aid dictated by the Conventions, 
without any additional constraints. Prohibitions on aid directed toward Iraq 
or Afghanistan, for example, would be limited to prohibitions equivalent to 
the limitations permitted under the relevant articles of the Conventions. 
On the assumption that Congress intended the override authority and the 
Conventions to coexist, a Presidential determination that contradicted the 
Conventions would violate international law and would conflict with the 
implementation of the Conventions on the domestic plane.1 13 In line with 
Charming Betsy, the Executive could not impose blanket prohibitions on 
delivery of aid without first ascertaining whether, for example, each affected 
organization was outside of the definition of impartial, and was acting in 
such a way that the prohibition did not "hinder the supply of effective and 
adequate relief to all protected persons."1 14 Charming Betsy therefore 
107. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. ,  509 U.S. at 8 17 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that comity in 
this context relates to the "respect sovereign nations afford each other by limiting the reach of their 
laws"); see also Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 599 (E.D.N. Y. 2002). 
108. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. , 509 U.S. at 8 15  (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that "interact­
ing interests" of the U.S. and other nations are controlling in attempts to reconcile domestic and 
international law). 
109. See Beharry, 1 83 F. Supp. 2d at 599. 
1 10. See Agee, 453 U.S. at 291 .  
1 1 1 . See Fourth Convention, supra note 1 ,  arts. 23, 55, 59, 63 and 142. 
1 1 2. See Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, Repon of the Comm. on For. 
Rel. on Executives D, E, F and G, 82d Cong., Executive Report No. 9, 32 (June 27, 1955) (urging 
the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification of the Conventions, noting that the Conven­
tions were "a landmark in the struggle to obtain . . .  a humane treatment in accordance with the most 
approved international usage"). 
1 1 3. An example of such a Presidential determination would be an inclusion of an impartial 
humanitarian organization within the sweeping language of Executive Order 1 3,224. 
1 14. Fourth Convention, supra note 1, art. 142. 
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demands narrow interpretation of a statute's text, in order to allow it  to co­
exist with international law. 1 15 
If IEEPA cannot be construed so as to avoid conflict with the Conven­
tions, Charming Betsy cannot resolve the question of whether the statute 
violates the treaty.1 16 The courts must look to other facts in order to deter­
mine which of the two constitutes the applicable law. When a statute is 
facially ambiguous and a conflict is not immediately apparent, courts will 
look at legislative history, the degree of discretion given to the Executive 
and the circumstances of Congressional silence in order to determine 
whether a conflict exists.1 17 In particular, IEEPA's delegation of discretion to 
the President may result in a different analysis than would be applied to a 
statute that relates to other aspects of domestic law because of its connection 
with situations of armed conflict and national security.118 
In order to invoke the override authority and unconditionally restrict or 
prohibit humanitarian action, the President must argue that IEEPA and the 
Conventions do conflict and that Charming Betsy does not require adher­
ence to the Conventions. There is a basis for this argument, particularly 
where discretion has been afforded to the Executive. l l9 The legislative his­
tory of IEEPA indicates a strong intent to create significant authority in the 
President to regulate movement of money and goods during situations of 
national emergency. 120 The statute does not specify narrow situations in 
which the restrictions and prohibitions apply, allowing all other transactions 
to occur unimpeded, but instead permits the reverse.121 Despite a lack of spe­
cific reference to the provisions of the Conventions, IEEPA appears to have 
1 15. Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1 145, 1 152 (7th Cir. 2001 )  (noting 
that Charming Betsy "has traditionally justified a narrow interpretation of ambiguous legislation to 
avoid violations of international law"). 
1 16. Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 1 18 (1804). 
1 1 7. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 ( 198 1 ); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453-
55 (1 1th Cir. 1 986), cen. denied, 469 U.S. 889 (1986). 
1 1 8. See Agee, 453 U.S. at 291 ("[l]n the areas of foreign policy and national security . . .  
congressional silence is not to be equated with congressional disapproval"). This is not to say that 
the judicial analysis stops; these situations of Presidential discretion resemble political questions, 
but remain in the realm of the courts. Agee was not decided as a political question case; the Court 
analyzed the authority of the President, acting through the Secretary of State, on the basis of the 
statute and its legislative history. See id. at 289 ("The principal question before us is whether the 
statute authorizes the action of the Secretary . . .  "); see also Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1455 (noting 
the relevance of executive acts and judicial decision where legislation does not clearly create a con­
flict between domestic and international law). 
1 19. See Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1455 (in which the court determined that an Executive act 
was "sufficient basis for . . .  finding that international law does not control"). 
120. See S. Rep. No. 95-466, at 5 ( 1 977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4540, 4544. The 
President may exercise the general authority of IEEPA, without a specific determination, in connec­
tion with all transfers except for those that "subvert, contravene, or preclude effective exercise of 
emergency authority." Id. 
1 2 1 .  The breadth of the statute reflects the committee hearings on the bill. See id. (including 
discussion of narrow exceptions to the transactions that can be restricted or prohibited, and noting 
that the exception for donations of humanitarian goods was narrowed to cover only those from U.S. 
persons and to omit donations from foreign individuals "because the free exercise of conscience 
cannot usually be presumed" for the latter). 
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been drafted with the intent of breadth. This level of Congressional intent 
alone might not be found to be a sufficiently "clear statement from Con­
gress" to override,122 but when combined with other arguments, 123 may 
provide the President with the ability to circumvent Channing Betsy. 
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits of the U.S. Courts of Appeals have re­
cently construed the Channing Betsy canon narrowly. 124 The Seventh Circuit 
determined in Sampson v. Federal Republic of Gennany125 that it did not 
need to read the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act consistently with cus­
tomary international law and jus co gens norms. In United States v. Suerte126 
the Fifth Circuit stated that Congress is not obliged to legislate in confor­
mity with international law, from which it could be argued that 
Congressional intent need not always be emphatic in order to establish a 
conflict, and therefore a need for analysis beyond Charming Betsy. In order 
to maintain the flexibility that IEEPA's language, standing on its own, con­
veys, the President can argue that there exists a trend, as shown by the 
Circuit Court decisions as well as by reference to Haig v. Agee121 and other 
Supreme Court discussion of the canon,128 toward a narrow reading of 
Channing Betsy. 
Finally, the George W. Bush administration has shown an inclination to 
implicitly read Channing Betsy narrowly, and to justify broad Executive 
powers as dictated by the necessities of the "war on terror." This can be 
viewed as a broad interpretation of the balancing of interests analysis set 
forth in Hartford Fire Insurance Co.129 and Beharry. 130 This inclination is 
evidenced in the Office of Legal Counsel's interpretations of the Geneva 
Conventions' application to current conflicts and participants thereto. 13 1 
1 22. Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 599 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
123. See supra text accompanying notes 1 17 through 1 19. 
124. See United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2002); Sampson v. Fed. Republic of 
Germany, 250 F.3d 1 145 (7th Cir. 2001). 
125.  Sampson, 250 F.3d at 1 1 51-53 (discussing the inapplicability of Charming Betsy to 
questions of sovereign immunity with respect to reparations in connection with the Nazi concentra­
tion camps, where only customary international law covered the issue). 
126. Suerte, 291 F.3d at 374 (stating that Charming Betsy "is not, as is sometimes implied, 
any impairment of our own sovereignty, or limitation of the power of Congress") (quoting Lauritzen 
v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953)). 
127. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 29 1 ( 198 1 )  (holding that the President has authority to re­
voke U.S. passports for reasons of foreign affairs and national security, despite Congressional 
silence with respect to the President's discretion). 
1 28. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 8 15  ( 1 993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that principles of comity do not preclude U.S. courts from exercising jurisdiction over 
foreign insurers in claims made under the Sherman Act). 
1 29. 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
130. Beharry, 1 83 F. Supp. 2d at 599 (holding that the Immigration and Naturalization Act 
must be read in compliance with international law). 
1 3 1 .  See Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: 
Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Consideration (2003), 
http://www.ccr.ny.org/v2/reports/docs/PentagonReportMarch.pdf. Although, in 2004, the Office of 
Legal Counsel withdrew a related 2002 memorandum from former Assistant Attorney General Jay 
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The combination of the discretion afforded the Executive in IEEPA gen­
erally, and specifically within the override authority section, as well as the 
weight given to issues of national security creates an argument for the Presi­
dent to show the existence of a conflict between the Conventions and 
IEEPA. If a conflict exists, Charming Betsy does not apply132 and it is neces­
sary to determine which of the conflicting laws applies. Since Charming 
Betsy is not going to end the discussion, it is necessary to further analyze the 
legality of acts permitted under the override authority. 
B. Domestic Legal Implications of a Violation of the 
Geneva Conventions 
The later-in-time doctrine is the customary method of analyzing con­
flicting laws, but is not clearly applicable to conflicts involving 
humanitarian law. The later-in-time doctrine provides that, in domestic law, 
a later statute takes precedence over an earlier conflicting international 
agreement. 133 The doctrine does not affect obligations on the international 
Bybee as having an excessively narrow interpretation of international and domestic prohibitions on 
torture, Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for James B. Corney Deputy 
Attorney General, Re: Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (December 30, 
2004), the media have reported that the Justice Department concurrently advised that torture could 
be used to obtain statements. See Carol D. Leonnig & Julie Tate, Detainee Hearings Bring New 
Details and Disputes, WASH. PosT, Dec. 1 1 , 2004, at A l .  The George W. Bush administration also 
denied application of the Conventions in connection with prisoners' rights. See U.S. Action Bars 
Right of Some Captured in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES at A l ,  Al2  (Oct. 26, 2004) (reporting that a March 2004 
memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel concluded that some non-Iraqi persons captured by 
the U.S. military in Iraq, like members of Al Qaeda, were not entitled to the protections of the Con­
ventions). This stance was rejected by the District Court for the District of Columbia in November, 
2004. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004), rev 'd, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 
2005), rev 'd and remanded, 2006 WL 1 764793 (U.S. June 29, 2006). 
1 32. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. , 509 U.S. at 815 ;  Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 
1 18 ( 1804); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1 446, 1455 ( I  Ith Cir. 1986), cen. denied, 469 U.S. 889 
(1986). 
1 33. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 1 90 ( 1 888) (holding that a general application im­
port statute passed after an import treaty was signed between the United States and the Dominican 
Republic, controls); see also The Chinese Exclusion Case, 1 30 U.S. 581 ,  600 (1 889); United States 
v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1 89, 2 14  (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("It is well-established that Congress has the 
power to override international law."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
§ l 15(1 )(a) ( 1987) ("An Act of Congress supersedes an earlier rule of international law or a provi­
sion of an international agreement as law of the United States if the purpose of the act to supersede 
the earlier rule or provision is clear and if the act and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly 
reconciled"). A strong view of the doctrine is that the original intent of the Framers and current law 
unequivocally support not only the doctrine but consequently-diminished obligations on all planes. 
Senator Jesse Helms, in comments made regarding the United States' payment obligations to the 
United Nations, expressed this view: "Treaty obligations can be superseded by a simple act of Con­
gress. This was the intentional design of our founding fathers, who cautioned against entering into 
entangling alliances. Now then, when the United States joins a treaty organization, the organization 
holds no legal authority over us." See U.S Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) Delivers Remarks to the UN 
Security Council, 2000 WL 422 12 (Jan. 20, 2000). Senator Helms's view caused considerable inter­
national consternation. See, e.g. , U.S. Senator Berates UN (January 2 1 ,  2000), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
1/hi/world/americas/612594.stm (noting negative reaction of members of the Security Council, 
including [the Russian representative] Sergey Layrov: "All the other members of the United Nations 
expected the United States to keep its word"). 
August 2006] IEEPA 's Override Authority 2041 
plane. 134 In other words, if Congress enacts legislation that is inconsistent 
with a treaty obligation, the domestic effect of the treaty is eliminated but 
the United States' obligations under international law, and the implications 
of such obligations, continue. The later-in-time doctrine is established under 
U.S. law with respect to bilateral treaties and to multilateral agreements that 
l bl. . 135 cover contractua o 1gattons. 
No case has yet raised the specific question of whether later domestic 
law categorically overrides a multilateral humanitarian or human rights 
treaty. 136 Congress enacted IEEPA after ratifying the Conventions, and, ap­
plying the established rule of later-in-time, the former overrides the latter to 
the extent domestic law relates to the United States' treaty obligations.137 
Growing debate over the universality of the later-in-time doctrine,138 com­
bined with the special nature of certain multilateral treaties, demands more 
thorough consideration of the override authority's effect on international 
obligations before applying the doctrine to the IEEPA-Conventions conflict. 
The later-in-time doctrine originated in a dispute over bilateral agree­
ments related to import duties, 139 unconnected to humanitarian or human 
rights issues. The Supreme Court held in Whitney v. Robertson: 140 
1 34. There is a plethora of support for continuing at least those obligations that exist on the 
international plane. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § J 15(1 )(b) ( 1 987). 
Furthermore: 
Just as a statute can be superseded by a later inconsistent statute, so can a treaty be superseded, 
although maxims of interpretation [e.g. Charming Betsy] encourage a judicial effort to con­
strue the later-in-time statute so as not to violate the treaty. If that effort fails, the legislative 
rule prevails internally, although as a matter of international law the United States has broken 
its obligations to the other treaty party. 
HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 1022 (2d ed. 
2000). 
1 35. See S. African Airways v. Dole, 8 1 7  F.2d 1 19 (D.C. Cir. 1 987) (holding that the Anti­
Apartheid Act unambiguously has precedence over a bilateral agreement between the United States 
and South Africa with regard to air services). 
1 36. The author's exhaustive search finds no case where this argument is considered directly. 
One recent case concerned the head of a U.S. charity indicted for diverting donated goods to terrorist 
organizations in Bosnia and Chechnya in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, but not under IEEPA. See 
United States v. Amaout, 282 F. Supp. 2d 838 (N.D. Ill. 2003). The government dismissed these 
charges and prosecuted only a charge of racketeering fraud. Id. at 840. Other recent cases have consid­
ered the inclusion of charitable organizations on the government's lists of terrorist organizations subject 
to IEEPA. See Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
1 37. See Taylor v. Morton, 23 F.Cas. 784, 786 (No. 13,799) (C.C. Mass. 1855), aff'd, 67 U.S. 
(2 Black) 481 ( 1 862) (distinguishing between those aspects of a treaty that relate to the people, 
which can be abrogated by Congress under a later act, and those aspects that relate to the govern­
ment, which create an ongoing obligation to treaty partners irrespective of Congressional acts). 
1 38. See Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy 
and International Law, 7 1  VA. L. REV. 107 1 ,  1 152 ( 1985) ("The doctrine making all international 
law rules, irrespective of their content or importance, inferior to later-in-time statutes no longer 
accords with contemporary international theory or practice."); see also HENKIN, supra note 30, at 
485 n. 1 30 ("In other contexts [citing Reservations to the Genocide Convention and The Palestine 
Liberation Organization Mission Controversy] it has been suggested that multilateral treaties are 
different because they are not primarily contracts among the parties."). 
1 39. Whitney v. Robertson, 1 24 U.S. 190, 1 9 1  (1 888). 
1 40. Id. 
2042 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104:2019 
By the constitution [sic], a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made 
of like obligation, with an act of legislation . . . .  when the two relate to the 
same subject, the courts will always endeavor to construe them so as to 
give effect to both . . .  but, if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date 
will control the other. 141 
Following Whitney, the government could justify derogation from do­
mestic obligations established by a treaty upon passage of a conflicting 
statute. Courts have accepted Congressional derogation of treaties related to 
h . . d 142 d 143 A 1 . 1 · 1 1 sue issues as import uty an tax. s cases re atmg to mu tt atera trea-
ties covering individual and human rights arose, no court ruled conclusively 
that the Whitney framework for the later-in-time doctrine applied. 144 Even 
where the courts supported the later-in-time rule, they gave some deference 
to the international obligations remaining after the enactment of a conflict­
ing statute, and to the weight of the United States' overall treaty 
obligation. 145 Doubt now exists over whether the later-in-time doctrine ap­
plies to all cases where treaties and statutes diverge; it is therefore 
imperative to question the doctrine's applicability to a conflict between the 
Conventions and IEEPA.146 
A leading case addressing application of the later-in-time rule to multi­
lateral treaty obligations, Diggs v. Schultz, 147 reveals issues that the courts 
would balance against a propensity for rigid application of the doctrine. Al­though the court upheld a domestic statute under the later-in-time 
doctrine,148 in its analysis of the importance of the UN Charter, Diggs offers 
a basis for identifying conditions under which treaty obligations continue on 
the domestic plane in the face of conflicting, later, domestic law. 
The Diggs court addressed a conflict between a UN Security Council reso­
lution that established a trade embargo with Rhodesia ("Resolution 232"),149 
1 4 1 .  Id. 
142. See Akins v. United States, 407 F. Supp. 748, 1 70 (Cust. Ct 1 976) (holding that customs 
duty payable where existing law conflicts with earlier treaty). 
143. See Kappus v. Comm'r, 337 F.3d 1053, 1 060 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that 26 U.S.C. 
§ 59(a)(2) governs despite an earlier conflicting treaty between United States and Canada). 
144. See Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461 ,  466 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 1 U.S. 931 
( 1973). 
145. Id. at 461 .  
146. See HENKIN, supra note 30, at 210-1 1 ("Particularly as regards multilateral treaties of 
general applicability which establish universal standards--on human rights . . .  -inconsistent legis­
lation by Congress not only violates international obligations but ruptures international consensus 
which the President-and-Senate helped achieve."); see also Lobel, supra note 1 38; infra notes 209-
2 10. 
147. Diggs, 470 F.2d 461 (holding that plaintiffs' argument that licenses permitting trade with 
Southern Rhodesia, issued pursuant to the Byrd Amendment to the Strategic and Critical Materials 
Stock Piling Act, violated Resolution 232 of the Security Council of the United Nations (which 
resolution was passed with an affirmative vote from the United States and subsequently imple­
mented on the domestic level) was a political question). 
148. Id. at 466. 
149. S.C. Res. 232, U.N. Doc. S/RES/232 ( 1966). 
August 2006] IEEPA 's Override Authority 2043 
and the Byrd Amendment'50 to the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock 
Piling Act, 151 that denied the President the right to restrict such trade. The 
Diggs court concluded that the earlier UN resolution protected against the 
appellant's alleged injury, stating that for people harmed by policies that the 
embargo was established to curtail, "United Nations action constitute[d] the 
only hope."152 The court noted that the dispute arose from actions "in dero­
gation of the solemn treaty obligation of the United States to adhere to the 
embargo for so long as it is in being."153 The court considered United Na­
tions obligations, which the United States affirmatively pledged to observe, 
to be of particular significance.154 
The court then addressed the contention that the United States' commit­
ment to the United Nations "has more force than an ordinary treaty"155 in its 
discussion of the later-in-time rule. The court replied in the negative to the 
"all or nothing" argument that it would be necessary to fully withdraw from 
the United Nations in order to override Resolution 232 but did not deny the 
assertion that treaties may be differently weighted.156 As a result of Diggs, 
the United States Ambassador to the United Nations testified to Congress on 
the difficulty of persuading others to live up to their legal obligations after 
the United States' violation of the Rhodesian boycott. 157 While these results 
are not complete confirmation that the doctrine is incompatible with multi­
lateral treaties on individual and human rights, the court did suggest some of 
150. 31  C.F.R. § 530 (1972) (removed, 57 Fed. Reg. 1 386 (Jan. 14, 1 992)). 
1 5 1 .  50 u.s.c. § 98 (2000). 
1 52. Diggs, 470 F.2d at 465. The court went on to say that the appellants "are personally 
aggrieved and injured by the dereliction of any member state which weakens the capacity of the 
world organization to make its policies meaningful." Id. Diggs was cited negatively in Dellums v. 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 863 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The complaint with Diggs does 
not, however, reject the court's acceptance of the treaty's import, see id. at 983 n.4 (Ginsburg, J. 
dissenting) ("Because Diggs retains vitality as a binding decision, it should guide this panel until 
overturned by the court en bane."), but rather the question of causal nexus. Id. at 976. 
1 53. Diggs, 470 F.2d at 465 (noting that the appellants' primary complaint was against the 
government of Rhodesia). 
154. Id. at 465 ("Appellees suggest that the prospects of significant relief by means of the 
embargo are so slight that this relationship of intended benefit is too tenuous to support standing. 
But this strikes us as tantamount to saying that because the performance of the United Nations is not 
always equal to its promise, the commitments of a member may be disregarded without having to 
respond in a court to a charge of treaty violation."). The court held for the plaintiffs on the issue of 
standing, and it is therefore appropriate to rely on the court's reasoning regarding the United Na­
tions. Id. 
1 55. Id. 
1 56. Id. (noting that, despite the fact that the sanctions imposed by the U.N. would not neces­
sarily provide a benefit to the appellants, "dereliction of any member state which weakens the 
capacity of the world organization to make its policies meaningful" created the injury). 
157. To Amend the United Nations Participation Act of 1 945 to Halt the Importation of Rho­
desian Chrome and to Restore the U.S. to its Position as a Law Abiding Member of the International 
Community: Hearing on S. 1868 Before the S. Subcomm. on African Affairs, Comm. on Foreign 
Relations, 93d Cong. 'II 1 5  ( 1973) (statement of John Scali, United States Ambassador to the United 
Nations) (noting that Congressional derogation of international obligations would make it both more 
difficult for the United States to convince other nations to comply with international law, and more 
likely that other nations would question the dependability of the United States and the strength of 
the Security Council in general). 
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the anomalies between the doctrine and international law obligations. The 
opinion reflects an apparent bias toward the United Nations as a unique 
mechanism supporting individual rights. 158 
The District Court for the Eastern District of New York in Beharry v. 
Reno159 commented on a practical problem with applying the later-in-time 
doctrine in this context by noting judicial unease with perfunctory override 
of human rights treaties: 
Once this country says there is a U.N. Charter, there are U.N. covenants, 
there are treaties, and we subscribe to them . . .  there are going to be civil 
and perhaps criminal consequences that we might not all think are so won­
derful. But you can't simply say that we're going to have treaties for the 
rest of them but, of course, they won't apply to us. 160 
There is a basis for limiting the later-in-time rule and its effect on a mul­
tilateral human rights treaty. 161 The nature of the multilateral contract and the 
objectives set forth therein are relevant to determining the stringency with 
which the doctrine applies, particularly where the subject is human rights.162 
Categorical acceptance of the later-in-time doctrine is thus eroded in certain 
circumstances. The Conventions, like the UN Charter, are of a different na­
ture from a standard bilateral treaty and fall into a category of international 
agreements that compels special adherence.163 
United States courts have consistently emphasized the critical nature of 
the Conventions. 164 The United States District Court for the Southern Dis­
trict of Florida discussed the obligations of the Third Convention in some 
1 58.  Diggs, 470 F.2d at 465 ("the United Nations constitutes the [appellants'] only hope"); id. 
at 466 ("the purpose and effect of the Byrd Amendment. . . .  was to detach this country from the 
U.N. boycott of Southern Rhodesia in blatant disregard of our treaty undertakings"). 
1 59. 1 83 F. Supp. 2d 584, 584 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
1 60. Id. at 601 (citing Statement of Jon 0. Newman, 1 70 F.R.D. 201 ,  3 1 7-18 (1996) (Judicial 
Conference of the Second Circuit)). 
1 6 1 .  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 1 15 cmt. 2 (1987) ("[l]t has 
been urged that the doctrine should not apply to inconsistency between a statute and general interna­
tional law established by multilateral treaty."). 
162. See Lobel, supra note 138, at 1074 ("A complete deference by United States courts to 
executive orders or congressional acts irrespective of international law implications would be simply 
inconsistent with the spirit and rationale of Nuremberg."). 
163. There is an argument that international humanitarian law is close to jus cogens, and 
therefore not only different in character from bilateral and non-human rights related multilateral 
treaties but in fact nonderogable. Nonderogable rights are those that cannot be infringed on even 
during a state of emergency, war or other crisis. BoucHET-SAULNIER, supra note 8, at 108. 
1 64. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisenstrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 n. 14 ( 1 950) (noting the United 
States' obligations under the Conventions); United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1097-98 (D.C. 
Cir. 199 1 )  (noting the United States' status as a signatory to the Conventions and agreeing with the 
District Court's use of the Convention's language in its analysis); Coal. of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. 
Supp. 2d 1 036, 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (referring to the United States' agreement to be bound to 
certain treatment of prisoners under the Convention and noting its application to some of the detain­
ees held at Guantanamo Bay following the United States' military action in Afghanistan); United 
States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791 ,  795 (S.D. Fla. 1 992) (analyzing prisoner of war status under the 
Third Convention). The George W. Bush administration has shown an inclination toward increas­
ingly selective application of the Conventions. See supra note 1 3 1 .  As of the date of this writing, 
courts have not addressed the statements and opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel. 
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detail in United States v. Noriega. 165 The Noriega court emphasized "the 
United States' asserted commitment to . . .  promoting respect for the laws of 
armed conflict through liberal interpretation of the Geneva Conventions."166 
The court strongly endorsed the United States' compliance with the Conven­
tions, noting both their wide scope167 and importance.168 
Consistent with the courts' indications that multilateral human rights 
treaties merit different analysis, the common scholarly view acknowledges 
the later-in-time doctrine as good law but emphasizes the continuing nature 
of international obligations.169 The resulting separation of a single treaty into 
its domestic and international components establishes that although treaties 
and statutes are constitutional equals, 110 they are not identical. 171 This distinc­
tion stem� from what is often considered to be the original intention of the 
Framers, to uphold treaty obligations or to rectify a breach.172 The evolution 
of the later-in-time rule is a partial repudiation of this intention173 but some 
of the Framers' aims survive. That application of the rule does not diminish 
obligations toward treaty partners is not just a consequence of limited Con­
gressional powers;174 it is also a result of the contractual relationship among 
165. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. at 803 (holding that incarceration in federal penitentiary was not a 
violation of the Conventions as long as treatment provided the rights allocated by the Third Conven­
tion). 
166. Id. at 80 I. 
1 67. See id. at 803 (" Considerable space has been taken to set forth conclusions which could 
have been stated in one or two pages. That is because of the potential importance of the question to 
so many .... "); id at 795 (''The United States is a firm supporter of the four Geneva Conventions of 
1949 .... As a nation, we have a strong desire to promote respect for the laws of armed con-
flict. ... " (citing Letter from the State Dept. to the Attorney General of the United States (Jan. 3 1 ,  
1990))). 
168. See id. at 803. 
169. See HENKIN, supra note 30, at 209 ("Acts of Congress inconsistent with earlier treaty 
obligations have been given effect by the courts .... Such legislation does not affect the validity of 
the treaty and its continuing international obligations for the United States, but it compels the United 
States to be in default."); Detlev Vagts, Taking Treaties Less Seriously, Editorial Comment, 92 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 458, 460 (1998) ("the later-in-time rule is not the end of the matter, since an obligation to 
other countries continues to exist independently of the treaty's status in American law "). 
170. See Head Money Cases, 1 12 U.S. 580, 598 ( 1884). 
1 7 1 .  See id. a t  599 ("[A]n act o f  Congress . .. which may be repealed or modified b y  a n  act of 
a later date "). 
172. Numerous authorities support the contention that equality of treaties and statutes was not 
clearly specified in the drafting of the Constitution. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 30, at 2 1 0  ("As an 
original matter, the equality in U.S. law of treaties and federal statutes seems hardly inevitable; 
surely, the Supremacy Clause which the Supreme Court invoked does not establish it."); Detlev F. 
Vagts, The United States and its Treaties: Observance and Breach, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 313, 3 1 3-14 
(200 1 )  [hereinafter Vagts, Observance and Breach] ("In the past, the courts and the political 
branches consistently acknowledged ... if the United States breaches [a treaty], it has an obligation 
to set the matter straight. ... There is good reason to believe that the [later-in-time] rule would not 
have commended itself to the founders' generation "). 
1 73. Vagts, Observance and Breach, supra note 172, at 313  (noting that the three branches of 
the federal government have "conspicuously verbalized the idea that .. . the binding effect of inter­
national law carries little weight, " thus supporting the later-in-time rule as absolute). 
1 74. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 ( 1979) (dismissing the question of whether the Presi­
dent can unilaterally rescind a treaty as nonjusticiable, with the effect that it is the President who has 
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the treaty parties 175 and, in certain situations, of the significance and impor­
tance of the issue addressed. 176 
Current judicial and scholarly views on the strength and scope of the 
later-in-time doctrine are not uniform, and it may be assailable in the con­
text of the Conventions.177 Although IEEPA will control under a strict 
reading of the doctrine,178 the United States' domestic obligations under the 
Conventions, including the duty to permit access by impartial humanitarian 
organizations, will survive because of the nature of multilateral treaties em­
bodying humanitarian obligations. 
C. International Legal Implications of a Violation 
of the Geneva Conventions 
Convention obligations that do not impinge on activities subject to do­
mestic adjudication are unaffected by application of the later-in-time rule 
because they are distinct from domestic implementation of the treaty. 179 The 
United States must be able to perform these obligations in full in order to 
avoid sanctions or legal action. 18° Conflicting domestic law does not dimin-
the ability to do so); see also HENKIN, supra note 30, at 209 (noting that passing a conflicting statute 
is not a repeal of the treaty because "Congress is not acting upon the treaty but, in exercising one of 
its powers, it legislates without regard to the international obligations of the United States"). 
1 75.  See THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 332 (John Jay) (Max Beloff ed., 1948) ("[A] treaty is 
only another name for a bargain; and that it would be impossible to find a nation who would make 
any bargain with us, which should be binding on them absolutely, but on us only so long and so far 
as we may think proper to be bound by it."). 
1 76. For example: 
It very well may be that a statute can override a treaty, but when dealing with a fundamental 
institution like the United Nations, can the United States argue that the provision of the Head­
quarter.; Agreement relating to the arbitration requirement does not apply, while the United 
States continues to operate under the other provisions of the agreement? When this matter is 
ultimately decided by the courts, they will have to address the issue as to whether the Charter 
of the United Nations and the Headquarter.; Agreement are just ordinary treaties. 
Leonard B. Boundin, Remarks, The Palestine Liberation Organization Mission Controversy, 82 AM. 
Soc'y INT'L L. PRoc. 534, 54 1 ( 1988); see also Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the 
United States, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1555, 1 569 n.44 ( 1984) ("The [later-in-time) rule may be different 
in respect of . . .  provisions of multilateral treaties that recognize rights for private persons, notably 
human rights."). 
1 77. Paul C. Szasz, Director of the General Legal Division of the United Nations, Remarks, 
The Palestine Liberation Organization Mission Controversy, 82 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PRoc. 534, 538 
( 1988) (''The later-in-time rule depends on a series of court decisions which . . .  are decisions that 
bear reexamination, particularly as to their applicability to multilateral treaties such as the U.N. 
Charter and to agreements made pursuant to the Charter.") 
1 78.  See Whitney v.  Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 1 94 ( 1 888). 
1 79. Id. at 2 1 0; see also Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 
937 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("Our conclusion, of course, speaks not at all to whether the United States has 
upheld its treaty obligations under international Jaw." ). The question here is how treaty obligations 
differ pre- and post-domestic implementation, rather than whether the treaty is self-executing-i.e., 
whether domestic application of treaty obligations requires Congressional action. See Foster v. 
Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 3 1 4  ( 1 829) (distinguishing non-self-executing treaties from self-executing 
treaties). 
1 80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § I J5( l)(b) ( 1987). 
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ish the validity of international treaty obligations and, therefore, IEEPA does 
not change the United States' obligation to comply with the Conventions on 
the international plane.181 The Conventions require affirmative actions by the 
signatories.182 These actions cannot be segregated so that they occur only on 
the international plane and they are therefore subject to domestic law.183 A 
prohibition under IEEPA on these affirmative duties to act on both the do­
mestic and international planes makes performance under the Conventions 
an impossibility.184 
It could be argued that the Conventions create only an end-that the 
specified goods must reach persons in need-and do not specify the means 
by which that end must be achieved, thus allowing the type of discretion 
delegated to the President in the override authority.185 For all their specificity 
in identifying items to be provided to non-combatants, the Conventions 
leave the scope of some obligations open to interpretation: for example, the 
Occupying Power's obligation to provide these items when the local supply 
is "inadequate."186 The absence of an absolute definition of impartiality in 
the Conventions187 shows further lack of clarity. These apparent holes could 
support a contention that any individual Party to a conflict is justified in its 
own assessment of adequate performance under the Conventions and that, as 
a consequence, performance on the international plane can be satisfied 
without any domestic action. 
This argument fails for two reasons: first, the parties to a conflict might 
not effectively achieve even adequate performance of the required end.188 
Second, as discussed above, the Conventions allocate certain rights to im­
partial humanitarian organizations themselves.189 It is not, therefore, simply 
181. Although the Constitutional text Jacks clarity regarding authority to terminate treaties, it 
is well-established that conflicting legislation alters only the domestic effect of a treaty. See id. 
("That a rule of international Jaw or a provision of an international agreement is superseded as do­
mestic law does not relieve the United States of its international obligation or of the consequences 
of a violation of that obligation."); HENKIN, supra note 30, at 173. 
182. The Parties are obligated to comply with the Conventions. See Common Article 2, supra 
note l ;  Common Article 3, supra note 1 (obligating the Parties to comply with the Conventions to 
ensure access by impartial humanitarian organizations); supra note 10; Fourth Convention, supra 
note 1, arts. 23, 55 (obligating Parties to provide, and to provide passage of, certain goods). 
183. See supra notes 15 to 19 and accompanying text. 
184. W hen the override authority is invoked, the general prohibitions and restrictions of the 
statute apply, permitting, inter alia, a prohibition on donations of humanitarian articles. 50 U.S.C. 
§§ 1702(a)( l)(A), 1702(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. II 2002). 
185. See COMMENTARY I, supra note 10, at 12-13 ("A choice had to be made between elabo­
rating very full and detailed rules covering all possible eventualities, or formulating general 
principles sufficiently flexible to be adapted to existing circumstances"). The Commentary further 
notes that the inclusion of "general and indefeasible principles" helped to achieve this flexibility. Id. 
186. Fourth Convention, supra note 1, art. 55 (requiring an Occupying Power to provide 
specified articles "[t]o the fullest extent of the means available to it"). 
187. See supra note 51. 
188. See supra note 54. 
189. See supra note 53. 
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Presidential discretion that determines what constitutes compliance with the 
international obligations arising under the Conventions. 
The aid obligations and impartial humanitarian organizations' right to 
access contained in the Conventions argue against designating the conflict 
with IEEPA a political question. Application of the political question doc­
trine results in nonjusticiability for certain situations of foreign affairs. 190 
The Supreme Court has clarified the circumstances in which the doctrine 
applies, stating that it excludes from review "those controversies which re­
volve around policy choices and value determinations . . . .  "191 Adherence to 
the Geneva Conventions, a multilateral treaty with 1 90 signatories that is so 
widely accepted that it is considered customary international law, 192 should 
not depend on a policy choice or a value judgment of an Executive immune 
from review. More recently, the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia in United States v. Lindh193 discussed Presidential determinations 
under the Conventions and stated that "[c]onclusive deference [to the Presi­
dent], which amounts to judicial abstention, is plainly inappropriate."194 
The United States has an obligation to provide care to non-combatants 
and to allow an identified group of organizations access to ensure that the 
aid arrives . 195 The President does not have a right under the Conventions to 
determine whether the United States has such an obligation. The situations 
in which both the Conventions and IEEPA apply often, if not always, coin­
cide with situations in which the foreign affairs power permits the Executive 
to make policy choices and value judgments. 196 The conflict between the two 
laws merits judicial review, which is not excused by the political question 
doctrine. 197 
On the international plane, the United States has an unambiguous obli­
gation to comply with the Conventions.198 The International Court of Justice 
190. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 1 86, 2 1 1-12 ( 1962) (listing factors to be taken into account 
in determining whether an issue is a nonjusticiable political question). 
1 9 1 .  Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 22 1,  230 ( 1 986) (holding that the 
"political overtones" of a controversy surrounding whaling quotas did not bar judicial inquiry). 
192. See supra note 12 ;  see also BoUCHET-SAULNIER, supra note 8, at 65 (noting that all four 
Conventions have the status of customary international law). 
193. 2 1 2  F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
194. Id. at 556-57. 
195. Common Article 1 ,  supra note l ;  Common Article 3, supra note l ;  Common Article 
9/10, supra note I .  
196. Lindh, 2 1 2  F. Supp. 2d at  555-56 (discussing situations in which the President, as  Com­
mander in Chief, should be given deference by the judicial branch, but concluding that the 
determination, in this case, relating to the applicability of the Conventions during a national emer­
gency did not demand judicial abstention). 
197. Id. at 556 ("At the highest level of abstraction, it may be argued that the Constitution 
commits the conduct of foreign affairs to the President. This is hardly a clear, demonstrable constitu­
tional commitment to the President to construe and apply treaties free from judicial review. Indeed, 
as Baker warns, 'it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations 
lies beyond judicial cognizance.' ") (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 1 86, 2 1 1  ( 1 962)). 
198. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 156 (D.D.C. 2004), rev 'd, 4 1 5  F.3d 33 
(D.C. Cir. 2005), rev 'd and remanded, 2006 WL 1764793 (U.S. June 29, 2006) ("It is universally 
August 2006] IEEPA 's Override Authority 2049 
stated this very clearly in Military and Paramilitary A ctivities: 199 "[T]here is 
an obligation on the United States Government, in the terms of Article 1 of 
the Geneva Conventions, to 'respect' the Conventions and even to 'ensure 
respect' for them 'in all circumstances."'200 Subsequent cases decided by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and the International Crimi­
nal Tribunal for Rwanda reiterated the enforceability of the Conventions.201 
As the United States Supreme Court has often reiterated, "[i]nternational 
law is part of our law."202 In some circumstances, a conflicting domestic 
statute will not inhibit the United States from performing its international 
obligations under an earlier treaty and will change only the conditions under 
which a claim can be made following a violation.203 In this case, interna­
tional law remains "our law" 204 without controversy. In other circumstances, 
a bar on the domestic plane will inhibit performance on the international 
plane. 
An example of the latter situation arose when the 1 987 Anti-Terrorism 
Ad05 mandated the closure of the Palestine Liberation Organization 
("PLO") UN Observer Mission.206 The convergence of the domestic statute 
and international obligations under the UN Headquarters Agreement, under 
which the United States gave the UN the right to invite non-members to be 
present at its headquarters as observers,207 made compliance with both 
agreed, and is demonstrable in the Convention language itself . .. that Common Article 3 embodies 
'international human norms' "); see also Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 14, 'l! 218 (June 27). 
199. 1986 1.C.J. 14. 
200. Id. at 'l! 220. 
201. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. I CTR-96-4-T, 'l! 4 ( Sept. 2, 1998) ("According to 
Articles 2 to 4 of the Statute relating to its ratione materiae jurisdiction, the Tribunal has the power 
to prosecute persons .. . responsible for serious violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Con­
ventions of 12 August 1949 on the protection of victims of war "); Prosecutor v. Tadi , Case No. IT-
94-1-1, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 'JI 143 (Oct. 2, 
1995) (concluding that the ICTY had the authority to apply the Conventions). Although these cases 
do not specifically address the obligations of the United States, they provide the basis for enforce­
ability of signatories to the Conventions. See id. at 'l! 270 (July 17, 1999); see also Jan E. 
Aldykiewicz & Geoffrey S. Com, Authority To Court-Martial Non-U.S. Military Personnel For 
Serious Violations Of International Humanitarian Law Committed During Internal Armed Conflicts, 
167 MIL. L. REV. 74, 127 (2001) ("The cases decided after Nicaragua establish, beyond any doubt, 
that violations of Common Article 3(1) ... are serious violations of international humanitarian law 
resulting in universal jurisdiction and giving rise to individual criminal responsibility "). 
202. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 
U.S. 692, 730 (2004) (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 700 (1900)). 
203. See Lobel, supra note 138, at 1073 ("The conventional justification for according the 
political branches the constitutional power to violate international law posits a dichotomy between 
the national order and the international order .. .. The government is legally answerable only in the 
international sphere, with enforcement left to appropriate sanctions imposed by other nations.") 
(internal citations omitted). 
204. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. 
205. Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 5201--03 (2000). 
206. Id. § 5202(3). 
207. 22 u.s.c. § 287. 
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impossible.208 The UN Headquarters Agreement required the United States 
to extend certain privileges to observer missions.209 The later Anti-Terrorism 
Act prohibited, inter alia, the establishment of any office with the purpose of 
furthering the interests of the PL0.210 The court stated, "[w)e believe the 
[Anti-Terrorism Act] and the Headquarters Agreement cannot be reconciled 
except by finding the [Anti-Terrorism Act] inapplicable to the PLO Ob­
server Mission."2 1 1  Although the court relied on the Charming Betsy212 canon 
that statutes should be construed to comply with the law of nations if possi­
ble, 213 it was a stretch to assert that the language of the ATA showed no 
congressional intent to override the treaty. 2
14 As the PLO case shows, even if 
courts accept the later-in-time doctrine unconditionally, at times implemen­
tation of the domestic law will necessarily violate the international 
bl. . h" h h l 215 th 216 d 217 • l o 1gat10ns w 1c t e aw, e courts, an commentators consistent y 
support. 
208. For example: 
Everyone agrees that the Anti-Terrorism Act, at least insofar as it applies to the PLO Mission 
at the United Nations, is a violation of the Headquarters Agreement and, presumably, the Char­
ter of the United Nations that the Agreement implements. The question that is posed in the 
litigation, . . .  is whether the statute has priority over the Charter? I must say that I am puzzled 
by a statement . . .  that the international obligations of the United States remain in effect. If 
they remain in effect, it is very difficult to see how the statute can be carried out. 
Boundin, supra note 1 76, at 541 . 
209. The Agreement Between the United Nations and the United States Regarding the Head­
quarters of the United Nations, 26 June 1 944, reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 287 [hereinafter 
Headquarters Agreement]. 
2 10. 22 U.S.C.A. § 5202(3) ("It shall be unlawful, if the purpose be to further the interests of 
the Palestine Liberation Organization . . .  to establish or maintain an office, headquarters, premises 
or other facilities or establishments within the jurisdiction of the United States at the behest or direc­
tion of, or with funds provided by the Palestine Liberation Organization or any of its constituent 
groups, any successor to any of those, or any agents thereof."). 
2 1 1 . United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
2 1 2. See Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 1 18 ( 1 804); PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1465. 
2 1 3. The Palestine Liberation court reasoned that "neither the Mission nor the Headquarters 
Agreement is mentioned in the [Anti-Terrorism Act] itself," PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1468. However, 
the language of the Anti-Terrorism Act specifically prohibits PLO offices, supra note 2 10. The court 
next reasoned that "while the section of the [Anti-Terrorism Act] prohibiting the maintenance of an 
office applies 'notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary' it does not purport to apply 
notwithstanding any treaty." PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1468 (internal citations omitted). The Headquar­
ters Agreement, however, has been implemented into domestic law. 22 U.S.C. § 287. The PLO 
court's determination that a treaty is not the law is inconsistent with Supreme Court decisions. See, 
e.g., Head Money Cases, 1 12 U.S. 580, 598 ( 1 884) ("A treaty, then, is a law of the land as an act of 
Congress is . . . .  "). 
2 1 4. See Vagts, supra note 1 69, at 1 59 (noting, apparently with some sarcasm, that "[o]nly 
heroic efforts to interpret the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 so as not to evince an intent to overrule a 
prior international agreement . . .  prevented a statute from putting [the United States] in violation of 
[its] treaty commitments"). 
2 1 5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW § l J5(l)(b) ( 1987). 
2 1 6. See Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461 ,  465 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cen. denied, 4 1 1 U.S. 931 
( 1 973); Beharry v.  Reno, 1 83 F. Supp. 2d 584, 601 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
2 1 7. See supra note 1 8 1 .  
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IEEPA and the Conventions create a problem similar to that of the PLO 
mission, in that exercise of the override authority would prohibit activities 
that the Conventions mandate.218 Under IEEPA the President can choose to 
bar the export of items such as food and medicine by an impartial humani­
tarian organization subject to United States jurisdiction.219 The Conventions 
obligate Parties to permit these same organizations access to deliver these 
same goods.220 The United States cannot, therefore, comply on the interna­
tional plane while prohibiting on the domestic plane the activities necessary 
for compliance. 
Where the domestic and international planes coincide, co-existence of 
the later-in-time rule and treaty obligations creates a paradox that current 
doctrine cannot always resolve. In this case, it is not possible to read consis­
tency into the statute in adherence to the Charming Betsy canon.221 Although 
impartial humanitarian organizations, and more generally, supporters of the 
Conventions, would argue that Charming Betsy dictates that courts must 
carve the Conventions' aid obligations and rights of access out of Executive 
Orders pursuant to the override authority, there is no statutory text in IEEPA 
to interpret in connection with the Conventions' specific references to im­
partial humanitarian organizations.222 In order to accede to this request, 
courts must read limitations into the text of IEEPA,223 which requires a level 
of judicial activism beyond that which the courts have considered Charming 
Betsy to permit.224 Once the existence of a conflict has been established, 
courts will apply the later-in-time doctrine,225 but where, as here, the prohib­
ited and required acts are one and the same, the later-in-time analysis does 
not provide resolution. For IEEPA and the Conventions to coexist with re­
spect to impartial humanitarian organizations and their activities during 
armed conflict, courts must relax the later-in-time doctrine. 
2 1 8. See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(2); Common Article 3, supra note l ;  Common Article 9/10, 
supra note 1 .  
2 1 9. 50 u.s.c. § 1702(b)(2). 
220. See, e.g., Third Convention, supra note 1, art. 73; Fourth Convention, supra note 1, art. 
23, 55, 59. 
221 .  See Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 1 17-1 8  ( 1804); see also Richard A. Falk, 
Remarks, Palestine Liberation Organization Controversy, 82 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PRoc. 534, 546 
( 1988) ("This set of controversies that has exposed our country externally to such an awkward set of 
contradictory commitments provides us with the challenge and opportunity to rethink the place of 
international law in our constitutional process and, in the broader sense, of relating it in a more 
systematic and effective way to the conduct of foreign relations."). 
222. See Joan Fitzpatrick & William Bennett, A Lion in the Path? The Influence of Interna­
tional Law on the Immigration Policy of the United States, 70 WASH. L. REV. 589, 593-94 (1995) 
(noting that when U.S. political branches violate treaties "they must act unambiguously . . .  Breach 
of treaty or customary law should not be permitted to occur by implication"); see also text accom­
panying notes 1 12 to 1 17. 
223. See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(2) (creating the override authority). 
224. See Ralph Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory 
Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1 103, 1 167 (1990). 
225. See supra note 1 28. 
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D. Policy Implications of a Violation of the Conventions 
International agreements, especially those related to humanitarian law 
and human rights, by their nature raise issues of foreign policy.226 While 
courts at times dismiss claims as political questions addressable only by the 
legislature and the executive,227 such dismissal is not a foregone conclu­
sion. 228 Whether or not the Conventions are of such a nature as to preclude 
automatic application of the later-in-time rule, 229 and whether or not adher­
ence on the international plane is made impossible by the domestic 
legislation, 230 policy grounds tip the balance and require that courts find that 
the later-in-time doctrine does not apply to multilateral humanitarian treaties. 
International law depends a great deal on nations' assessments of their 
own needs for reciprocity and credibility on the international plane.231 Do­
mestic self-interest is also a significant consideration, but it is often bounded 
by the more complex considerations of reciprocity and credibility to balance 
short-term and long-term costs and benefits of compliance.232 
226. The policy considerations relate to the United States' interests in the international and 
domestic arenas and to the practical implications of limiting and politicizing humanitarian aid. See 
Chew Hong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 539-40 (1884) (" 'There would no longer be any secu­
rity,' says Vattel, 'no longer any commerce between mankind, if [nations] did not think themselves 
obliged to keep faith with each other, and to perform their promises.'" "[T]he court cannot be un­
mindful of the fact, that the honor of the government and people of the United States is involved in 
every inquiry whether rights secured by such [treaty] stipulations shall be recognized and pro­
tected."). 
227. See Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 
(1973) ("The considerations underlying [the passage of the B y rd Amendment] by Congress present 
issues of political policy which courts do not inquire into. Thus, appellants' quarrel is with Con­
gress, and it is a cause which can be pursued only at the polls and not in the courts."). 
228. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d 
Cir. 1995). 
229. See supra text accompanying note 177 et seq. 
230. See supra text accompanying note 218 et seq. 
231. See Oscar Schacter, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 7 (1991) 
("[G]overnments will weigh a possible breach by them against their interest in reciprocal obser­
vance by the other party. They will also consider the likelihood of retaliation and other self-help 
measures by that party. Nor would they ignore the negative consequences of a reputation for repudi­
ating their obligations."). 
232. For instance: 
In part, the United States adheres to human rights conventions because it is concerned to main­
tain leadership in international affairs by proving that it deserves it, by its behavior at home 
and by its willingness to join in cooperative international efforts . .. .  In larger part, the United 
States is concerned to see minimum standards .. . observed in other countries in order to . . .  
promote conditions that are conducive to U.S. prosperity and to U.S. interests in peace and se­
curity. 
HENKIN, supra note 30, at 475. In some cases, the United States has renegotiated treaties in order to 
correct the conflict created by a later-in-time statute. President Chester A. Arthur vetoed the original 
version of the Chinese Exclusion Act because it did not conform with an existing treaty. 13 CONG. 
REC. 2551-52 (1882). The question has been posed whether the Conventions themselves need revi­
sion to conform to the world of the 21st century. See E-mail from A.W.B.  Simpson, Professor of 
Law, University of Michigan Law School, to author ( Nov. 5, 2002, 10:28:00 E.S.T.) (on file with the 
author). 
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Reciprocity demands a longer-term view of both the objectives of the 
Conventions and the possibility that the beneficiaries of the treaty obliga­
tions might be United States citizens.233 The Noriega court's argument in 
favor of enforcing the Convention obligations toward prisoners of war heav­
ily emphasized the need to ensure similar treatment of United States troops 
in the future. 234 The court also justified its holding by noting that adherence 
is necessary "[i]n order to set the groper example and avoid diminishing 
trust and respect of other nations." 5 The Conventions have wide scope236 
and broad support,237 and there is thus a strong policy argument against 
derogation and for reciprocity because future armed conflict is unpredict­
able.23s 
Credibility plays a similar role in compelling adherence to treaties, in 
particular treaties related to human rights and humanitarian action, due to 
the fact that the United States publicly asserts that it is a strong advocate for 
and supporter of higher global standards for individual rights throughout the 
world.239 Derogation from treaty obligations that enforce such goals under­
mines efforts at achieving them.240 The need for credibility is bound with the 
233. See supra note 175. 
234. See United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 79 1 ,  803 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (ordering the Attorney 
General and the Bureau of Prisons to set sentencing keeping in mind "the importance to our own troops 
of faithful and, indeed, liberal adherence to the mandates of Geneva III"); see also News Release, 
Headquarters United States Central Command, Coverage of POW's and Deceased (Mar. 23, 2003), 
available at http://www.centcom.miVCENTCOMNews/News_Release.asp?NewsRelease=20030352.txt 
(requesting that the media not publish images or other identifying information on United States 
military held as prisoners of war in Iraq "[o Jut of respect for the families and consistent with the 
principles of Geneva Conventions"). 
235. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. at 802-03. 
236. The Conventions apply to "armed conflict," internal and international. See Common 
Article 2, supra note 1 ("[T]he present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any 
other armed conflict which may arise . . .  "). 
237. 1 90 nations are signatories to the Conventions. See Champ d 'application, supra note 5. 
238. See To Amend the United Nations Panicipation Act of 1 945 to Halt the lmponation of 
Rhodesian Chrome and to Restore the U.S. to its Position as a Law Abiding Member of the Interna­
tional Community: Hearing on S. 1868 Before the S. Subcomm. on African Affairs, Comm. on 
Foreign Relations, 93d Cong. ( 1 973) (statement of John Scali, United States Ambassador to the 
United Nations); Vagts, Observance and Breach, supra note 1 72, at 33 1 (overriding treaties by 
internal action "is the most provocative of all tactics"). 
239. See Department of State Protocol Il Letter, supra note 103, at 567 (''The United States 
has traditionally been in the forefront of efforts to codify and improve the international rules of 
humanitarian law"); Interview by Wolf Blitzer with Donald Rumsfeld, United States Secretary of 
Defense, in Washington D.C. (March 23, 2003), available at http://www.cnn.usnews.clickability. 
com/pt/cpt?action=cpt&expire=- l &urllD=5786054 (stating that Iraq must treat POWs "according to 
the Geneva Convention, just as we treat Iraqi prisoners according to the Geneva Convention"). 
240. For instance: 
The United States cannot expect to reap the benefits of internationally recognized human 
rights-in the form of greater worldwide stability and respect for people-without being will­
ing to adhere to them itself. As a moral leader of the world, the United States had obligated 
itself not to disregard rights uniformly recognized by other nations. 
Beharry v. Reno, 1 83 F. Supp. 2d 584, 601 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
2054 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104:20 19 
need for reciprocity ; enforcement of and adherence to international law 
norms are not separable. 
On the domestic plane, public perception and reaction play a role in dic­
tating international policy. The media have disseminated information about 
potential terrorist funding,24 1  and Congress has addressed the issue in hear­
ings with charitable organizations and other experts.242 The Attorney General 
has investigated, and continues to investigate, alleged schemes to portray 
funds sent to support Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations as humani­
tarian aid.243 The acts of the United States toward non-combatants during 
situations of armed conflict are visible and generate either support or lack of 
support for the nation's military engagements. Policy decisions about provi­
sion and prohibition of aid, therefore, must take into account public reaction 
to humanitarian crises in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other nations in which the 
United States military acts.244 Exercise of the IEEPA override authority and 
the consequent lack of sufficient humanitarian aid will increase the severity 
of such crises and will diminish the credibility of the United States on the 
domestic as well as the international plane. 
Given the aforementioned objectives of reciprocity, credibility, self­
interest, and domestic approval, the United States benefits by adhering to 
the Conventions.245 Humanitarian organizations provide support to the 
United States in performance of its obligations because the nature of armed 
conflict makes it impossible for Parties themselves to fulfill the require­
ments of the Conventions.246 Former Secretary of State Colin Powell's 
241 .  See, e.g. , All Things Considered: Timing of Charity Shutdown Troubles Muslims (NPR 
radio broadcast Oct. 26, 2004), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyld=41 2752 1 ;  Four People, Charity Charged with Sending Millions to Iraq, 
CNN.com, Feb. 26, 2003, available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/02/26/charity.arrests.ap/ 
index.html. 
242. Role of Charities and NGO 's, supra note 47, at 2 (statement of Sen. Evan Bayh) ('This 
hearing has been called to send a very clear signal that those who use the cover of humanitarian and 
charitable efforts to hide their support for the murderous acts of terrorism should have no safe har­
bor in our country"). 
243. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Prepared Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft, Crimi­
nal Indictment Announcement, http://usinfo.state.gov/is/ Archive/2004/Sep/20-829053.html (Sept. 
17 ,  2004) (listing examples of indictments against those accused of providing support to alleged 
terrorists via charitable organizations established in the United States). 
244. The decision as to whether to engage in humanitarian intervention often turns on the 
public's reaction to, and perception of, humanitarian crises. For example, concerns over the fate of 
Iraqi citizens were relevant to certain decisions related to the U.S. military's activities following the 
March 2003 invasion. See Humanitarian Intervention: A Forum, NATION, July 14, 2003, available 
at http://www.thenation.com/doc/200307 14/forum (discussing the relevance of human rights and 
related concerns in the context of military interventions). 
245. See Vagts, Observance and Breach, supra note 1 72, at 329 ("[T]the weighing of longer­
run interests in reputation and a stable international legal system against the immediate gains from 
treaty defection is still a matter of instinct and judgment rather than calculation."); see also supra 
note 1 3 1  and accompanying text regarding the G.W. Bush administration's increasing inclination 
toward selective application of the Conventions. 
246. See Rafa Vila San Juan, Sec'y Gen. & Chair, Steering Comm. for Humanitarian Re­
sponse, Humanitarian Action Must Not be a Tool of Political Interests (July 1 8, 2002), available at 
http://www.msf.org/msfintemational/invoke.cfm?objectid=065898A6-5322-4EE6-
88C8BF97B39CB5AC ("Impartial humanitarian assistance is a response to an urgent and inalien-
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remark that non-governmental organizations are "a force multii;>lier for us 
. . . an important part of our combat team"247 belies the Conventions' re­
quirement of impartiality.248 Impartiality is a prerequisite for achieving the 
goals of the Conventions. Humanitarian organizations that operate impar­
tially and that join the ICRC as valid providers of humanitarian aid during 
situations of armed conflict by law cannot be removed from that role, nor is 
it in the U.S.'s interests to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
The President's ability to place unilateral restrictions on humanitarian 
donations under IEEPA is overreaching and implementation of the override 
authority creates an imminent risk of violations of international law in situa­
tions of armed conflict. In addition, humanitarian organizations can be 
reluctant to provide impartial aid in precisely the situations where it is 
needed most because of the very existence of potential controls and their 
sanctions. Courts have read the Charming Betsy doctrine narrowly in certain 
contexts, such that IEEPA and the Conventions will not be read as consistent 
in the circumstances relevant to the use of the override authority. The exis­
tence of this conflict requires analysis under the later-in-time doctrine. The 
later-in-time doctrine does not necessarily apply to the Conventions; more­
over, use of the doctrine could result in legal and political repercussions 
because of the particular nature of multilateral humanitarian treaties. Al­
though courts and commentators conclude that the later-in-time doctrine is 
viable with respect to domestic obligations, the doctrine should not apply 
where domestic law bars not only domestic performance but also impedes 
obligations on the international plane. In addition, policy considerations 
preclude automatic use of the later-in-time rule. The "penumbra! obligation 
of treaties,"249 particularly where the object is humanitarian aid, requires 
narrow tailoring of measures to avoid support of terrorism. 250 
able right in itself, whereas peace-making or peace-keeping operations inevitably have a partial and 
political mandate. Which means . . .  that civilian, humanitarian organisations cannot operate under 
the command of the military."). 
247. Colin Powell, U.S. Sec'y of State, Remarks to the National Foreign Policy Conference, 
(Oct. 26, 2001 )  (comments in relation to, inter alia, activities in Afghanistan in October 2001). 
248. See Common Articles 3 and 9/10; see also Iraq: Independent Humanitarian Aid under 
Attack, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/ideas/iraq_ l l - l  0-2003.cfm (last visited 
July 5, 2006) ("[T]he US's attempt to partially justify its military goals as 'humanitarian' has seri­
ously undermined the very principle of true humanitarian action: unconditional provision of 
assistance to those in need without taking sides in a conflict."). 
249. Vagts, Observance and Breach, supra note 172, at 323. 
250. Other laws, both domestic and international, exist to effectively control funding of terror­
ists, a valid international concern. See supra note 98; see also Press Release, International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War (Feb. 9, 2002), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteengO.nsf/i wpList74/26D99836026EA80DC1 256866061 OC90 
("The ICRC remains firmly convinced that compliance with international humanitarian law in no 
manner constitutes an obstacle to the struggle against terror and crime."). 
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